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
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A GIANT AMONG PYGMIES:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES OF AMERICAN NEGOTIATION
IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

by

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
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE NATO DEBATE

Extended American involvement in an Asian war has in recent years given impetus to a debate of national proportions, not only about Vietnam but also about the nature of America's role and responsibility in international life and about priorities in domestic and foreign policies. It is the purpose of this particular study to review and evaluate one aspect of that debate--America's role in Europe, or more specifically, America's role in the North Atlantic Alliance.

In view of the discord current in discussions of America's role in international life, it seems appropriate to introduce this study of the United States' role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with a survey of current attitudes toward and appraisals of America's present (i.e. historic) role in NATO in addition to a more comprehensive review of the arguments questioning the continued justification of NATO's very existence. Against the backdrop of these fundamental issues, it will be possible to devote the body of the paper to the particular aspects of America's role in an alliance in which she is a giant among fourteen pygmies.

While participants in the debate over the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States' role in that alliance may be individually placed along a continuum from conservative defenders of the status quo to radical protagonists for the "end of alliance," for the purposes of this study, the debate will be consolidated into arguments for and against the maintenance



of the status quo. It seems best to begin with a summary of those arguments against the status quo. The more "radical" views of this controversy have been popularized by such writers as Walter Lippmann, Hans J. Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, Ronald Steel, James Avery Joyce, and David Calleo. Furthermore, such voices as those of J. William Fulbright and Eugene McCarthy in the Senate have given authority to the idea that NATO and its purposes represent an old myth. In essence, these spokesmen echo the disenchantment of intellectuals who look upon NATO as an ugly and unnecessary relic of the Cold War.

From all the arguments in favor of a revision of the North Atlantic Alliance, one may extract three basic factors as sources of dissatisfaction with NATO as it presently exists. The first is the belief that America has over-extended herself, that her international role is demanding too much of the country's resources and that Europe is the most stable and most likely area in which the United States can begin to reduce her responsibilities. The second point of criticism directed toward the status quo stems from an updated perception of world conditions which rejects the old model of duopoly. The third strain of controversy relates to the nature of the nuclear age. This argument claims that nuclear weapons have made alliances obsolete.

According to the last mentioned view, no nation will jeopardize its survival for another when faced with the risk of total destruction. If there is, then, an absolute distinction between deterring an attack on one's own territory

"I.P."

and deterring it on the territory of an ally, the fate of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance is to separate or to federate. This theory can foresee no middle course.¹

Of those itemized above, perhaps the most common argument leveled against the Alliance and America's hegemonic role within that alliance is the one which submits that NATO is the institutionalization in Europe of America's imperialistic vision of herself in the world. This school of thought has publicized the costliness of our European commitments while simultaneously it has criticized the disproportionate share of NATO's job the United States has done. This line of reasoning claims that Western Europe today offers a splendid prospect for a rational devolution of American responsibilities because Western European resources are now collectively as great, if not greater, than those of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, principal West European countries have stable democratic regimes, and the Common Market offers hope for intimate cooperation among governments.² The crux of this argument is that if the United States cannot turn away from imperialistic pretensions in Europe where we are no longer needed, the likelihood of a reduction anywhere of our unrealistic international responsibilities is nil.

The final argument to be elaborated is an attack against the validity of the basic set of premises about world conditions that have guided American (hence NATO) policy-makers since the time of Harry Truman. Put simply, this argument claims that American policy is based upon an irrational and outdated fear of a Communist bogey. These revisionist critics

point out that there is new evidence about the Communist enemy which alters the original premises upon which the Alliance founded. James Avery Joyce sums up this evidence under two headings: (1) The Communist world is split from top to bottom and thus no longer presents the monolithic conspiracy against the West which dominated the thinking of political leaders in the 1950's; and (2) The new face of China as a nuclear superpower calls for a world program for bringing the Communist and non-Communist peoples together to save them from a common grave. Long-range programs of coexistence between the alleged "two worlds" gain momentum from today's swift technological changes and particularly from the emergence of the Third World, which has a mind and will of its own.³ The logical development of this revised image of world conditions is a group of proposals advocating, in one form or another, the eventual dissolution of not only NATO but also of the Warsaw Pact.

That the arguments against American imperialism and against obsessive anti-Communism are related is obvious. These two arguments compose the rationale behind most anti-status quo proposals. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield introduced a resolution calling for a substantial reduction of U. S. forces permanently stationed in Europe. In his own words, Senator Mansfield was motivated by the disturbing fact that:

250 million people of Western Europe, with tremendous industrial resources and long military experience, are unable to organize an effective military coalition to defend themselves against 200 million Russians who are contending at the same time with 800 million Chinese, but must continue after 20 years to depend on 200

million Americans for their defense. The status quo has been safe and comfortable for our European allies. But, it has made the Europeans less interested in their own defense, has distorted the relationship between Europe and the United States, and has resulted in a drain on our resources which has adversely affected our ability to deal with the urgent problems we face at home.⁴

As stated earlier, anti-status quo proposals vary greatly in their degree of radicalism. Senator Mansfield's proposal is a moderate plan. Before moving to the conservative side of the NATO debate, it is worth quoting some rather radical ideas of James Avery Joyce, who is absolutely opposed to NATO but looks for the realization of an "All-European Non-Aggression Agreement" through the workings of the United Nations. Mr. Joyce concludes:

As soon as the NATO menace is removed from the Continent of Europe, the countless stores and barracks and air strips and camp grounds and tons of useless lethal equipment that it has accumulated at public expense can be contributed toward European economic and social betterment. NATO's nuclear weapons--hidden away under secret locks and keys--can be disassembled; some could be put on public exhibition (alongside their Russian counterparts perhaps?) at selected sites along the tourist highways as peace memorials symbolizing mankind's escape from strategic insanity.⁵

The conservative side of the NATO controversy is coterminous with the position of the "Washington Establishment." Thus, to a great extent, a statement of this side of the debate will take the form of an apology for present Washington policies. The essence of the argument of those who desire to justify the continuation of the North Atlantic Alliance in general and the continued stationing of American troops in Europe, in particular, is that since power has not been universally organized, the alternatives to a balance of power

are war, empire or chaos. NATO is the mechanism by which the balance system is operated in so far as Western Europe is concerned.⁶ The proponents of this line of thought believe that in many ways the problems of 1949 are the problems of 1971. The German question is unsolved; Berlin remains a problem. In the Mediterranean the Russians have made their challenge to NATO clear for over a decade. It is even believed that a Soviet initiative in the Middle East instigated Arab aggressiveness toward Israel and bore a major responsibility for the Arab-Israeli conflict of June, 1967.⁷ In 1948 when the Cold War was very cold, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak told Russian Andrei Vyshinsky at a U. N. Security Council session that: "The basis of our policy today in Europe is fear. We are afraid of you. We are afraid of your government, and we are afraid of the policies which you are pursuing."⁸

In short, the rationale behind NATO's justification was in 1949 and remains to be in 1971 the perceived Soviet threat. But beyond the fact that NATO is considered necessary for the defense of the United States (two world wars having convinced Americans that the security of the United States is directly linked to the security of Western Europe), to the Washington Establishment, the maintenance of the Alliance remains not only a major factor in America's role as a world leader but also a symbol of the continuing rejection of the once powerful and always attractive isolationist tradition. This, then, is the general outline of the pro-status quo NATO argument. From these premises, specific criticisms of revisionist views have been developed.

Of the more specific counter-attacks, it seems logical to begin with the argument opposing the most radical proposal-- the "death of alliances" doctrine. Supporters of the status quo claim that the basic weakness of the "doctrine of mutual pactocide" is that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are not at all equal, in content or in constitution. The Eastern Alliance is a means of control; the Western Alliance a method of consultation. Thus it is believed that the West should not condition NATO policy upon what happens in the Warsaw Pact, i.e., even if the Warsaw Pact were to abolish itself, NATO would still be needed as a Western solidarity organization to induce the Soviets to bargain realistically about European security and the German question. NATO's existence is deemed crucial in keeping honest whatever East-West bargains can be achieved in Europe. In sum, mutual trust is believed more credible if each side is able to ensure that the other is keeping his agree word.⁹

These views of apologists for the status quo have been argued with renewed vigor since the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. Before the Czech crisis, evidence was weighted in favor of those claiming that the Soviet Union now put its national ahead of its ideological interests and that it had confidence in the durability of its own system. However, the events in Czechoslovakia dramatically demonstrated that the Soviet Union still attaches great importance not only to the political loyalty of its East European allies, but also to their ideological conformity. The affair in Czechoslovakia in 1968 indicated to Washington that the USSR was prepared to

take great risks with its standing as a respectable world power in order to avert a local or internal danger. Thus the 1968 Soviet action gave new life to arguments to the effect that the dismantling of NATO would not induce a parallel abandonment of the Eastern Alliance, for the Warsaw Pact is more than a fearful response to a threatening Western defense system: it is, more significantly, a valuable ally-suppressing device.¹⁰

Less extreme than the call for abolishing NATO altogether is the demand for unilateral troop reductions in Western Europe. The defense against this proposal essentially argues that such an action would make East-West negotiations on mutual troop reductions in Europe meaningless. NATO has expressed interest in mutual troop reductions which would, in fact, be the only item of the so-called European Security Conference, so strongly advocated by the East, which would have anything to do with "security." But, it is pointed out, the Soviet Union is not likely to consider making any concessions in exchange for something it might be given free. Furthermore, as stated earlier, Washington believes that such an action would undermine efforts at détente, which it believes possible only if negotiated from a position of Western strength.¹¹

Another proposal which the Establishment must refute is the call for a reduction of the U. S. military presence in Europe. Basically, the argument against such a move runs that a massive American troop withdrawal would not stimulate Europeans to fill the gap but would, to the contrary, be

interpreted by them as a green light to reduce their own commitments as well. Moreover, the event of a massive American troop withdrawal would create dissension over who would fill the ensuing gap in Western conventional defense. While West Germany is considered the most likely candidate to assume the burden of the rejected American role, the prospect of further strengthening a nation which is already the most powerful conventional military force in Western Europe is highly undesirable to most of Germany's allies. Perhaps the clinching argument from defenders of the status quo against an American devolution of responsibilities in Europe is that even if all our current forces in Europe were brought home and stationed in this country, little or no savings would appear in our defense budget. In fact, it is said that we might even have to spend a bit more because we would lose significant financial advantages.¹²

In sum, policy-framers in Washington believe that without the United States, Europe would be, at best, a large Finland. These people are convinced that without commitments of American power, Europe must be a Russian dominated continent, not necessarily Communist, but Finlandized, overhung by Russia and continuously exposed to Soviet pressure.¹³

While the foregoing pages may themselves be confusing, they are, in fact, an attempt to simplify the jumble that one encounters in a survey of current thinking as regards NATO's present justification and future prospects. From this brief review it should be evident that the subject of this particular

study--the role of the United States in the North Atlantic Alliance--is itself a controversial topic. It seems essential, therefore, to establish at the outset certain assumptions upon which further discussion will be based. In choosing the argument of this paper, the author confronts the hazardous undertaking of offering guesses for which future events will yield proof or refutation. As Leslie Lipson observed: "When contemplating the age of which one is a part, it is particularly difficult among the changes going on before our eyes to disentangle those which will be of fundamental and permanent significance from those which are evanescent and superficial. But let us try."¹⁴

In scrutinizing the arguments for the pertinent facts, the first thing that occurs to this analyst is that NATO is a means to an end and should be dissolved if this end can be better served by other means or if the end no longer exists. What is this end? NATO is primarily a defensive alliance, formed to meet an actual or potential military threat which its members feel must be met collectively. Thus the first question becomes the reality of the Soviet threat. Two determining factors must be considered here: (1) The Soviet Union has a military capacity which dwarfs the forces of the European nations, singly and together. If NATO did not exist and American capabilities were not involved, the European countries alone could not prevent the occupation of the Continent by Soviet forces. (2) Since it is difficult to predict the behavior of governments (particularly of the USSR), security considerations must focus on the capabilities

of governments rather than on their changeable intentions.^{*} Acceptance of the above line of reasoning leads one to affirm the continued need for a security system in Western Europe.

The second question of the investigation then becomes: Is NATO the only effective means of providing military security for Western Europe? Several security alternatives to NATO have been proposed, though all appear unpromising to this writer. One is the plan for a politically united Atlantic community organized along confederate or federal lines. For the moment such designs conflict with stubborn loyalty to the principle of national sovereignty on both sides of the Atlantic and cannot be considered realistic alternatives. Another proposal foresees effective international arms control and disarmament agreements that would eventually free nations from the necessity of military security alliances. However, the slow progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks reveals the weakness of this plan. Still another suggestion is the establishment of a comprehensive security pact covering all the nations of Europe, East and West, excluding an American military presence on the Continent. As this observer perceives the present European situation, the earlier stated fear of a Finlandized Europe seems a valid basis on

^{*} A report of seven private investigators was released this spring which claims that the USSR appears to have embarked on a missile program aimed only at first-strike capacity as its superiority in ICBM's, and continued production of ICBM's after having reached a decided advantage, can be explained in no other way. This report is a prime example of the dilemma of weighing capabilities against intentions. (The report was cited by James Kilpatrick, "National Priorities: A Liberal-Conservative Confrontation," a debate with Frank Mankiewicz before the Adult Education Council, Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 1, 1971.

which to reject proposals for a comprehensive European security pact.¹⁵

As Mr. Lipson was quoted earlier as saying, it is very difficult to isolate the elements of fundamental and permanent significance when observing a changing international scene. However, for the purposes of this study, this author will commit himself to the position in the NATO debate which claims that the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is still essentially valid and that, moreover, NATO is for the moment the only effective means of carrying out that purpose. Having established this stand, it seems that the vital questions become: What kind of NATO is needed for the 1970's? And what role should the United States play within the Alliance? In considering these fundamental question, one will inevitably confront the trouble spots in North Atlantic relations, specifically the problems fostered by the lopsided nature of a giant working with fourteen pygmies. These considerations will guide the following investigation of the issue of America's hegemonic role in NATO. Again it will be difficult to disentangle the pertinent from the irrelevant factors, but, in the spirit of Leslie Lipson, "Let us try."

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The American Role in the Founding of NATO

Speaking at Georgetown University on February 8, 1971, Denis Healey graphically compared the NATO of 1949 to the classical Venus of Milo, "a body with all shape and no arms."¹ Mr. Healey's comment referred to the fact that the infant NATO was merely a mutual guaranty pact, not yet an organization for extensive military collaboration. In fact, it was not until the aftermath of the North Korean invasion that the alliance was transformed from what was essentially a multilateral framework for reinforcing America's guaranty to involve herself in the defense of Europe, into an integrated military organization.* In any case, the somewhat impotent shape of the newly formed alliance is irrelevant when weighed against the more significant fact that a treaty such as the NATO treaty had actually been signed.

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D. C. on April 4, 1949 crystallized a distinct turning point in American foreign policy. Having twice, in fairly rapid succession, felt compelled to intervene in bloody European wars, the United States resolved to abandon its prewar

*The political guarantee became an integrated military organization in early 1951 with the establishment of a central headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), followed in early 1952 by the creation of two other Supreme Commands: one for the Atlantic (SACLANT) and another for the English Channel and southern North Sea (Channel Command).

opposition to entangling alliances. American leaders now agreed that it was better to deter aggression by making visible advance preparations for meeting it. Moreover, the founders of the Treaty, wary of America's history of isolation and conscious of Europe's dependence upon American intervention in two world wars, believed that a truly entangling alliance, formally binding the United States within the mutual obligations of several states, was essential to make America's commitment to come to the defense of Europe convincing to the potential aggressor and to the potential victims of aggression as well. No fact more pointedly confirms the turning away from isolationism than the creation of this alliance, which explicitly insured that henceforth American security could be immediately and drastically affected by changes in the overseas balance of power, which the United States could not unilaterally prevent or counter.

The United States was never more resolute in its isolation than in the generation preceding the Second World War. While the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United Nations convention in San Francisco appear to be landmarks in the demise of isolationism, as one writer observed: "Neither the fears of 1941 nor the hopes of 1945 ultimately served as a sufficient catalyst to shake the nation from its illusions about American autarchy in a chaotic world."² However, American hopes for involvement without responsibility were short-lived. The Soviet Union's refusal to observe Western requirements for elections in East Europe, its support of Communist

subversive groups in Greece and its pressures on Turkey and Iran all indicated that Russian intentions conflicted with America's image of the postwar world. This situation demanded American recognition that not only was the Soviet Union a powerful physical threat to Europe, but also that no other power was available to subdue that threat. In facing this problem, American policy-makers also had to acknowledge the fact that there was a balance of power in 1946 and that American power was the vital element in the maintenance of the balance.

Thus the emergence from isolationism and the rediscovery of Europe by the United States did not happen overnight. Yet whatever the specific time schedule, the rediscovery of Europe was concurrent with American entry into the Cold War. As early as February, 1946, George F. Kennan, charge d'affaires in Moscow, sent a cablegram to Washington that contained the seeds of his famous 1947 statement on containment. In 1946 Kennan said: "In the Soviet Union we have. . . a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with us there can be no permanent peace."³ In Kennan's view, then, what was needed in 1946 was first the acceptance of the balance of power as a rule of international life and, second, the assertion of leadership in maintaining the balance. Most significantly, Kennan claimed that only an American presence in Europe could restrain the Soviet Unions' impulse toward expansion. What Kennan advocated was an American presence "expressed by diplomacy" rather than by military weapons.⁴

It was not long before Kennan's views--in a modified form--were incorporated into Truman policy. The opportunity for America to assert a "presence in Europe" came in 1947 with Britain's inability to continue its assistance to Greece and Turkey in their struggle against Communist pressures. It became apparent to Truman at this time that the alternative to immediate American action was the loss of Greece and Turkey, and perhaps even the loss of Europe itself, to Communist subversion and ultimate conquest. The result was a decision to give emergency military support to Britain as well as four hundred million dollars in emergency aid. In announcing these plans to a joint session of Congress, President Truman proclaimed what was to be the death knell to the last gasps of official isolationism:

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own country.⁵

While the details of the Truman Doctrine were being discussed, the new Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State was examining ways of expanding aid so that massive economic assistance could be provided to Europe. The upshot of these considerations was the Marshall Plan.

While the events in Greece and Turkey provided the initial impulse for concrete American steps towards committing itself to Europe, a new crisis in Czechoslovakia produced an impetus for the strengthening of that commitment. In February, 1948, Czechoslovakia, whose leaders Eduard Benes and Jan Masaryk had

close ties with the United States, fell prey to a Communist coup. The Soviet seizure of Czechoslovakia, climaxing a series of ominous events--the failure of the Moscow Conference (in March and April, 1947) to reach a settlement over Germany, Russia's active opposition to the Marshall Plan, her formation of the Cominform, her clandestine support of Italian and French strikes--soured Britain and France (already allied in the Dunkirk Treaty) to combine with Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in the Brussels Treaty of March, 1948. This treaty was a fifty-year military alliance pledging all its members to meet an "armed attack in Europe" upon any one member with "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." One week before the Brussels Pact was signed, Britain's foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, proposed an Atlantic security policy to the United States. One month after the signing of the Brussels Pact, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, suggested that the Brussels powers merge into a single defense system embracing the countries of North America and Western Europe.⁶

However, at the time the United States was not ready for formal alliance with the Brussels Treaty powers. As explained by Lawrence S. Kaplan:

To join a military alliance, particularly a European military alliance with a life span of fifty years, would pit an insecure administration squarely against a tradition that went back to Washington's warnings of 1796 and to the Convention of Montefontaine of 1800 which concluded the last alliance with a European country. Such a relationship would be of a different order from direct military assistance to a beleaguered country and even from the carefully programmed economic support of a group of countries. It would openly

depart from the profession of faith in the United Nations and professions of distaste for the balance of power made concurrently with the unilateral actions that underlay implementation of the containment plan.⁷

On the other hand, the United States government did officially encourage the signatories of the Brussels Treaty to believe that, as in the case of the Marshall Plan, their joint efforts would present the United States with a suitable basis for extending some kind of political support and material assistance. Accordingly, on June 11, 1948, the senate endorsed by an overwhelming majority of sixty-four to six the Vandenberg Resolution, which proclaimed as American policy the "association of the United States by constitutional process with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid and as affects its national security."⁸ Such a resolution for "association" did not violate Washington's eighteenth century warnings, but neither did it satisfy the members of the Brussels Pact. No resolution would meaningfully satisfy their desire for security unless American "association" was equated with membership in the alliance and embraced Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty, which guaranteed military and other aid to any attacked member from all other contracting parties.

American hesitancy in 1948 to join a full-fledged military alliance with Europe was further undermined by Russia's imposition of the Berlin blockade at the end of June. The Soviet blockade of Berlin forced the United States to grapple with problems of protecting West Germany from Soviet aggression and of protecting West Europe from the fear of a revived Germany. In short, the Berlin blockade convinced American

leaders that the war-weakened European nations could not simultaneously recover their economic and political stability and build the military strength they needed to withstand Soviet pressure unless they received American material help and the assurance of American military support in a real crisis. Thus it became apparent that the Vandenberg Resolution was a compromise that could not last and that there was no real alternative to an alliance in which the United States was fully joined to West Europe if the purposes of both the Marshall Plan and the Brussels Pact were to be served.

In July preliminary negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty began in Washington. However, it was not until the 1948 Presidential Campaign had passed, and Truman was safely re-elected, that the President had the confidence to announce in his Inaugural Address of 1949 that the United States was "working out with a number of countries a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic Area. Such an agreement would take the form of a collective defense arrangement within the terms of the United Nations Charter."⁹ Thus it was that by April the five nations of Brussels had become the twelve nations of NATO. On July 21, 1949, the U. S. Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty; the United States had rejected its isolationist tradition.

What, then, can one conclude from this brief survey of the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that is of significance to a study of the hegemonic American role in NATO? The two main points seem clear, if not entirely consistent. The first is that the United States did not take the

initiative in the creation of the Alliance. To the contrary, it was the suggestions of British Mr. Bevin and Canadian Mr. St. Laurent, which proposed a transatlantic alliance to legally implicate the United States in the affairs of Europe. The second point is that from the beginning, the rationale for American membership in NATO differed significantly from reasoning behind other signatories' memberships. The United States was not just another member; it was the key member on whom the real security of another Continent relied. From the beginning, in short, it was the American role to provide what the other Allies could not provide, whether it was a direct contribution in the form of land, sea, air and nuclear forces or indirect assistance in the form of military or economic aid.*

Perhaps these conclusions seem too facile to merit mention. Perhaps not. In any case, it does appear to be of fundamental importance that the giant-byemyn relationship was inherent in the Atlantic Alliance as early as 1040. Furthermore, it seems of great significance that this situation was deemed desirable by the Europeans as well as by the Americans in this early stage. In sum, in the initial phase of the North Atlantic Alliance, before the Korean War and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major nuclear power, the alliance was considered a profitable balance of assets over liabilities for all its signatories.

*It might be argued here that the treaty of 1040 is a good deal less than the organization built upon its foundation in 1951. Although the treaty does provide for a Council and permits it "subsidiary bodies," the present institutional growth--the Supreme Allied Commanders and their integrated staffs--were all later additions. As mentioned earlier, it was the Korean invasion, in June of 1950, that precipitated the evolution of NATO from a transatlantic mutual assistance treaty into an integrated military alliance, run by the United States. Still, that NATO was born in two distinct stages does not detract from the main point that American preponderance was implicit from the beginning of the Alliance.

Traditional Concept of Distinctive roles played
by the U. S. in NATO

Having reviewed the origins of America's preponderant role in the transatlantic alliance, it is possible to take a more refined look at the components of that leadership role. It was suggested in the introduction to this study that the American role in Europe has in recent years been a subject of heated debate. Before discussing the substantive issues of that debate, it will be useful to develop a working notion of what constitutes the traditional American role in Europe. In this endeavor it seems appropriate to borrow the seven-role scheme developed by William T. R. Fox and Annette P. Fox in their book, NATO and the Range of American Choice.*

The first American role defined by the Foxes has been to make good the deficiencies of the alliance as a whole. The Foxes cite a lengthy list of contributions as evidence of this role, which it will be useful to summarize. In the first years after the war, aid consisted largely of World War II stocks of equipment given to European allies which were rebuilding armed forces almost from scratch. During this first period, which was the period of the first Soviet atomic bomb test and peak of the Korean War, the United States began a program of "offshore procurement," which helped the Europeans set up their own productive facilities for military equipment. This program, coupled with NATO's Annual Review procedure,

*The following section is a presentation of that seven-role analysis worked out by Mr. and Mrs. Fox in their chapter, "American Perspectives: The Role of the United States in NATO," pp. 59-77 in NATO and the Range of American Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

allowed the United States to exert pressure indirectly on the European allies to improve their defense forces in directions which would support strategies and policy objectives approved by the United States. From the start, American defense officials rationalized the military aid program by claiming that the security of the United States depended upon allied forces as well as on its own; hence the allied forces had to be brought up to American standards; and thus aid was necessary.

The type of American aid given to the NATO allies changed in about 1955 due to the growth of European prosperity and the changing nature of the perceived Soviet threat. After 1954 military aid funds were for maintenance, "modern" (nuclear and non-nuclear) weapons available only in the United States and "critical" types of equipment, and training in the use of such weapons and equipment. During this period, Greece and Turkey alone continued to be important recipients of military assistance grants. As direct American aid diminished, the United States supported such cost-sharing projects as the Maintenance and Supply Service, the Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center, the Air Defense Technical Center, and the Mutual Weapons Development Program. During these years the United States also began licensing American weapons systems and equipment for joint production by a number of manufacturers in the NATO countries.

The 1960's ushered in a new period in the undertakings of this first American role in NATO. During these years the

inflow of payments for military equipment came to exceed the flow outward in military aid to the European allies. The Americans further reduced their burden by substituting the instruction of allied teachers for allied trainees for direct American training of allied military personnel.

A final aspect of "filling deficiencies of the alliance as a whole" relates to the naval side of NATO. Here one can point to the United States Sixth Fleet, which composes the major element of NATO's naval strength in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean naval units of other NATO countries are assigned to the protection of this fleet. Moreover, NATO naval strength in the Atlantic depends upon American ships to provide the giant share of that strength.

The second American role in NATO has been to act as pilot in the strategic planning of the alliance. This job as strategic pilot has been a problematic and burdensome task for the United States. The crux of the trouble is that in the first years of the Alliance, American military officers did not consider the possibility that the creation of NATO would alter their planning for American security by requiring them to share the responsibility for that planning with others. As the nuclear deterrent increased in importance after 1954, the divergence of views vis-à-vis America's proper role in this regard became evident.

In connection with the first two roles itemized by the Foxes, a third role of guiding the general policies of NATO should be considered. As conceived by the authors of this

typology, this role includes the double-edged ability to take the initiative in the policy-forming process as well as to exert a virtual veto power. For example, American initiatives in the adoption of the principle of collective, balanced forces and in the creation of the posts of SALEMUR and SACIAUT are cited. Also, the admission of three new members, chief among which was Germany (whose rearmament had been an American goal since 1950), came about primarily through American persistence.

On the negative side of this role of general policy guidance, one can remember instances when other members' suggestions did not get very far if met by American disapproval. Lack of enthusiasm on the part of the United States as regards expanding the non-military tasks of NATO has been one such case. Probably the essence of this role can be summed as follows:

Highly attractive inducements continue to make American guidance palatable, particularly to the poorer countries of the Mediterranean. In recent years United States officials have talked a great deal about listening to their allies' views, but when they fail to hear a united voice from the other side of the Atlantic, they do not wait long before filling the aching void with their own proposals--to the satisfaction of most of the allies, it should be added.¹⁰

However, at times the American leadership role cannot be overt but must utilize more subtle methods. Such indirect means must be sought in carrying out the fourth role of inducing, energizing, and stimulating actions which the allies can only undertake by themselves. The most obvious example of this role is found in American efforts to elicit improvement

in the quality and quantity of forces the European allies contribute to collective defense. Other targets of American inducement have been research, development, and production programs. At first the United States aimed its stimulation at individual countries, but increasingly it has promoted cooperative programs that cross national boundaries.

The means adopted by the United States in carrying out this "energizing" role have been several. In the early years of the alliance, the United States could count on the military aid program to act as an incentive and lever of its allies' actions. More recently, Americans have relied on such measures as offers to facilitate the acquisition of desired military equipment, bids to contribute capital for joint enterprises in military items, and incentives of providing training in the use of "modern" equipment. As Mr. and Mrs. Fox perceptively remark, training and exchange programs have the double advantage that by reaching key people or individuals who will become leaders, the American influence becomes self-perpetuating. A final general method of persuasion has been the pep talk given by American officials which has become a ritual since the appointment of General Eisenhower as SACSEP.

The next two roles included in the Foxes' scheme are the roles which reveal the preponderant nature of the overall American role in the transatlantic alliance most markedly. They have been: (1) to fill the principal military commands in the alliance, and (2) to manage the nuclear deterrent for the alliance. While it seems evident that these two jobs are closely related, for the time being it is best to consider them separately.

The fifth role, then, has dealt with filling the military commands in the alliance. In theory, the North Atlantic Council appoints the Supreme commanders; in practice, a vacancy is always anticipated by the United States, which informally taps its allies' feelings regarding the acceptability of possible nominees. Previously informed, then, of allies' sentiments vis-à-vis various officers, the President submits a formal nomination at the request of the Council. This nominee is assured the rubber-stamp approval of the Council.

An important clarification to be made here is that although some of these commanders also hold American commands, in their NATO capacity, they do not officially take orders from the U. S. government. But at the same time, successive SHAPE commanders have publicly expressed their sense of double responsibility to NATO and to the United States government for carrying out their NATO duties. Traditionally, SACRUR, SACLANF, and the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean have all been Americans. Since in most of the NATO military command structure a commander and his deputy are of different nationalities, Americans have held high positions even where there are no American forces.

Managing the nuclear deterrent has already been listed as the sixth role. This role has been assumed by the United States less by the consent of its allies than by the unwillingness of Americans to share this role. A later chapter will analyze the problems involved with the nuclear deterrent in greater depth. For the time being, a brief review of American management of NATO's nuclear weapons is necessary as background to the next section of the study.

It has been suggested already that the initial phase of NATO was one of agreeably accented American preponderance. This applied to American control over the nuclear force of the alliance as well. As long as United States nuclear monopoly or preponderance lasted, the question of nuclear control in the alliance never really arose. Europeans could hardly doubt the credibility of the American nuclear threat. The American stake in Europe's independence was great and obvious. Moreover, the potential cost to the United States of fulfilling its guarantee was small. Under conditions of nuclear parity, however, control of nuclear forces became the critical issue for all the major allies. Discontent among the allies seemed to mushroom in 1957-58, and by the 1960's it had reached major proportions. The situation of nuclear parity made allies on both sides of the Atlantic uneasy about the policies of the other: the Europeans, for their part, questioned whether, in the face of a Soviet missile force capable of delivering thermonuclear bombs to the United States, the U. S. would live up to its pledge to use strategic weapons if an attack came in Europe, while the Americans, on their side, were worrying about proliferation. Thus the subject of "nuclear sharing" became an "issue."

A final role attributed to the United States in NATO by W. T. F. Fox and A. P. Fox has been to demonstrate by example what other allies might also profitably do. In contrast to her nuclear role, this category refers to conventional defense. This role is implemented by means of psychological impact as much as anything else. The most obvious of these

"demonstrations" has been the stationing of six divisions of the "best-trained and best-equipped American forces anywhere in the world" on the central front in Europe. It has been argued that American conventional forces in Europe have a green-light, red-light effect on the contributions of the European allies.¹¹ In consequence, proposals for significantly reducing the United States forces in Europe thus far have been put aside on the basis of the reasoning that instead of inducing the allies to fill the gap, it would cause them to lessen their own efforts and have other bad political effects. (Again, a more thorough analysis of this problem is included in a later chapter of this study). Other examples of this last role that might be included are: pilot projects such as the NATO Science Program and additions to the infrastructure, e.g., by financing a new communications system for an early-warning radar network.

The Fox analysis provides a good working base from which to plunge into a more rigorous investigation of the substantive problems involved in United States leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance. Realizing the traditional part played by the American allies in NATO, the issues of strategic leadership and the roots and implications of the political problems of leadership can be more thoroughly understood. Hopefully the problem areas considered in the following two chapters can then be matched against the traditional-role-framework in an attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the NATO debate.

CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

Background Summary of America's Strategic Doctrine

It is not possible to speak of a single strategic concept which could adequately and consistently embrace the defense of the whole of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe. The problems of defense differ substantially, for example, from the central front to the southeastern flank. Indeed, the contemporary political, psychological and technological environment militates against a neatly logical solution to the conventional versus nuclear military dilemma which could satisfy all the major NATO nations, each of which has its own perspective of the European security situation. If for no other reason than geography, then, the interests of the allies in their mutual security arrangements differ. NATO's effective strategy, as reflected in actual force dispositions and weapons, is an ambiguous compromise between the European and American views.

The history of the alliance's strategic doctrine has thus been dotted by conflict, controversy and change. Some general comments on the changes that have occurred in strategic policy during the life of the alliance were offered by The Center for Strategic and International Studies in their report,

NATO After Czechoslovakia:

Periodically in the past, there have been efforts to define strategic theories for the defense of Europe under such picturesque labels as 'forward strategy,' 'sword and shield,' 'trip-wire,' 'massive retaliation,'

'graduated deterrence,' 'the pause,' and 'flexible response.' Several of these terms have at times proved useful in focusing, and thus advancing, the intellectual debate over NATO strategy. More often than not, however, they have created more confusion and tensions than illumination in the councils of the Alliance and in public forums. Moreover, the renaming of strategy generally has not prompted a change in force goals and postures logically consistent with the 'new' doctrine. The record of twenty years suggests that the substitution of one term for another does not alter the basic strategy of NATO, which requires both a nuclear guarantee by the United States and the presence of U. S. forces in the central front.¹

In essence, the Center for Strategic Studies concluded that the basic strategic doctrine of NATO has remained intact over the last two decades. In effect, this conclusion may be generalized to apply to American strategic doctrine as well, for in the conflicts concerning overall strategic doctrine referred to above, the United States has generally benefited in lopsided compromises between American and European views. In fact, of the seven roles discussed in the preceding chapter, no two more vividly expose American hegemony in NATO than those of acting as pilot in the strategic planning of the alliance and of managing the nuclear deterrent for the alliance. In order to understand the role American strategic doctrine has played in NATO, it is necessary to specify what that doctrine is. Carl H. Anne, Jr. posits that the United States strategy in Europe can be broken down into three separate strategic concepts: general war, limited war, and arms control.

The general-war strategic concept is aimed first at providing deterrence against a direct nuclear strike on the territory of the United States and second at providing extended

deterrence to counter the threat of a major invasion of Western Europe. Integral to this concept are two somewhat loaded assumptions. First, since a common strategy vis-à-vis a general war is obviously vital, and since the Americans provide ninety-five percent of the integrated nuclear force, the United States claims that indivisible control is necessary and that, moreover, NATO should logically follow the strategic concepts set forth by the United States. Second, it is assumed that the American commitment to NATO is firm and uncompromising. As the following pages will reveal, these two premises of American strategic thinking are not always common to the foundational thinking of European strategic concepts.

For conflicts in Europe below the level of general war, the United States has formulated its second strategic concept of limited war. The emphasis of this concept is on reliance on strong conventional forces backed up by selected use of tactical nuclear weapons. The primary threat is seen as a purposeful Soviet invasion in Europe for limited objectives and the possible conflict that might arise inadvertently from a crisis situation. The rationale behind the limited-war strategy is to promote conventional buildup in order to provide additional options, not to shift to sole dependence upon conventional weapons and forces for the defense of Western Europe.

Approaching the danger of conflict in Europe from a third route, the United States has developed a strategic concept of arms control. This strategy aims simultaneously at reducing the possibility that conflict will occur and at limiting the

destruction in the event that war should come about. The rationale behind the arms-control strategy is that military means are cooperative as well as competitive. Within the North Atlantic Alliance, the significance of this concept has primarily hinged on the fact that preponderant power has placed the United States in the role of major spokesman for the West in seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union. The bilateral nature of the American attempt to seek some sort of arrangement with the Soviet Union on armaments has been a source of malaise within the alliance, especially as regards the French and German allies.²

The preceding concepts provide a skeletal summary of American strategic doctrine. The issues that have emerged in response to American advocacy of its doctrines within NATO are considered in the following section.



The issues: (1) Nuclear or Conventional Defense

The strategic debate which has been taking place since the beginning of NATO has assumed particular intensity since the 1961 re-ordering of emphasis placed upon United States strategic concepts. The issue of nuclear versus conventional defense can best be understood as emanating from a shift from stressing the general-war concept to concentrating on the limited-war strategy. In order to appreciate the reaction of the European allies to the change initiated by the Kennedy Administration, it is necessary to examine the doctrine that was replaced.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950 precipitated the fear that similar Communist aggression might be launched in Europe at any time. Reacting to this fear, NATO developed the Lisbon goals, which ambitiously envisaged a largely conventional defense of Europe. These plans provided for some thirty-five to forty regular and some fifty-five to sixty reserve divisions. At this time, NATO strategy was based on holding the enemy as far forward as possible: this was the concept of "forward defense," under which the territory of Western Europe would receive maximum protection against invasion. The catch to such a strategy was that the defending forces must have the strength to absorb the impact of an initial surprise attack without breaking. Unfortunately, it soon became apparent that no European ally was prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to raise these forces.

The advent of the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 led to a new defense policy--called the "New Look"--which placed much greater emphasis on nuclear forces. In January, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles declared that the Administration had decided to "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing," in order to obtain "a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost."³ In 1957 the United States submitted to NATO what came to be known as the Radford Plan. Based on the premise that NATO was inferior in conventional strength to that of the Soviet Union, and realizing that the Soviets had acquired nuclear weapons, this plan shifted NATO rationale to a strategy in which any major aggression would have to be met with nuclear weapons at the outset, in order to make the forward defense strategy credible. In other words, NATO had adopted the concept that any attack on Europe would involve general nuclear war.

According to Radford-Plan reasoning, the ground forces were to be a "trip wire" that could not hold back the enemy, but which could act as an impediment, or a screening force to ascertain enemy intentions, and could give the alarm that would allow the nuclear forces to strike. That the precarious trip-wire concept could lead to mistaking a border incident for a deliberate invasion led General Lauris Norstad, as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to advance his concept known as "the pause." This notion envisaged using shield forces--both conventional and tactical nuclear--to enforce upon the enemy a longer "pause" so that the aggressor could

reflect on the serious consequences of his military action before the full weight of the West's nuclear forces were launched.

Thus the Radford Plan led to the stockpiling in Europe of tactical nuclear warheads. At the same time that these tactical nuclear weapons were being moved into West Europe, the United States was advocating the installation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles on European territory, which at the time were thought by the Americans to be essential to close the feared "missile gap." The significance of the placing of these weapons in Europe was that it tended to mold the defense of Europe and the United States closer together, for as long as the United States believed that its European bases were essential to redress the strategic balance, an attack on Europe would threaten the survival of the United States immediately rather than indirectly.

In summary, NATO strategic policy throughout the Eisenhower Administration relied on the general-war concept, which emphasized a single all-out response. If general nuclear war proved inevitable, the goal was to be to destroy the opposing society virtually with one blow. Implicit in this strategy was complete dependence of the smaller NATO allies on American nuclear power.

With the coming to power of the Kennedy Administration in 1961, these policies were drastically and suddenly changed. The new administration sought to replace the general-war strategy with a doctrine which offered more alternatives. It attempted to develop the maximum number of options even for

the contingency of a general nuclear war--a strategy given the label "flexible response." The new strategic policies announced in June, 1962 by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara may be thought of as having three components. First, to preserve the credibility of strategic retaliation, this threat must be reserved for contingencies in which a Soviet attack is deliberate and large-scale. To cope with lesser contingencies in a manner designed to control escalation, the "shield" power of NATO should have a substantial capability to resist conventional attack by conventional means, and to resort to tactical nuclear weapons only if such a step up the escalation ladder is unavoidable. Second, the management of flexible options requires the centralization of strategic policy in United States hands. Third, in the event that strategic nuclear war became unavoidable, the United States should be ready to conduct it in a manner minimizing the mutual destruction of cities.⁴ In short, the new American administration chose to stress the limited-war concept of U. S. strategy. The two succeeding administrations likewise have chosen to emphasize this aspect of American strategy.

During the Eisenhower years, the Europeans had already come to realize that strategic nuclear deterrence was no longer unilateral. They had already come to fear that if the Soviet Union attacked Europe, the United States might not come to their rescue if doing so meant the destruction of American cities. The new strategic policies announced in 1962 greatly exacerbated this anxiety. When the Kennedy administration

sought to convince its allies to strengthen their conventional forces, the Europeans inquired whether the United States was reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons. Whereas the strategy adopted in the 1950's had insured the rapid escalation of any serious conflict to the level of strategic nuclear war, and hence had maximized deterrence of aggression, it was now feared that the strategy of multiple options might weaken strategic deterrence. If an aggressor did not have to expect immediate strategic retaliation, aggression might be less effectively deterred. Furthermore, the new strategy, by once again emphasizing defense as against deterrence, reopened the prospect that aggression would lead to the large-scale destruction of the area to be protected. Finally, the new strategy required the NATO allies in Europe to assume larger defense burdens for strengthening local defense capabilities.

While America's allies (excepting France) finally accepted the doctrine of flexible response, they were extremely slow in following up their acceptance of the doctrine by improving their shield forces. Indeed, the immediate trend was toward decreasing defense expenditures and terms of military conscription while defense outlays went up in the Warsaw Pact countries. Behind this lapse lay (and still lie) the unwillingness of Western European electorates to spend heavily on defense and their continued preference to meet all but the most limited acts of aggression with the threat of nuclear war.

Though the controversy over the role and level of the shield forces has not yet found a completely satisfactory

solution, pressures from the NATO giant were at last successful in instigating a one-billion-dollar program for the 1970's that will dramatically upgrade Europe's conventional, non-nuclear forces. This program, adopted in a December, 1970 NATO meeting, is the first major NATO program that will be paid for entirely by European members. The West Germans alone will pay for forty percent of the "infrastructure" items, and will also provide low-cost credit to Turkey for its share. Even Luxembourg, with its army of 560 men, responded to the call and doubled its normal pledge.⁵

In essence, the crux of the nuclear-conventional force issue hinges on the paradoxical argument between the United States and Europe over whether an increase in NATO's strength would weaken its overall defensive posture. To summarize, the West Europeans have been in the past and are today more interested in the maintenance of a credible deterrent than in planning for the actual fighting defense of Europe. They fear that if war should occur, Europe would be converted into a battlefield between two giant contenders. Not wishing to leave a potential aggressor in doubt, they want the threat of nuclear response kept high. Thus they seek continual and convincing reaffirmation of the U. S. nuclear guarantee and look askance when pressured to increase their conventional forces.

(2) Nuclear Control: National Nuclear Forces

The emphasis on conventional weapons inherent in the strategy of flexible response had the strange consequence of adding fuel to the fires of another issue: that of nuclear control. As long as the American nuclear monopoly or preponderance lasted, the question of nuclear control in the alliance never really arose. Europeans could hardly doubt the credibility of the American nuclear threat. The American stake in Europe's independence was great and obvious. Above all, the potential cost to the United States of fulfilling its guarantee was small. Under conditions of nuclear parity, however, control of nuclear forces became a critical issue for all the allies.

The new variable interjected into this issue by the emphasis on conventional weapons was that these weapons gave the United States an alternative to nuclear retaliation. While formerly willing to acquiesce in the hegemonial position of the United States due to the assurance of an American nuclear response, the European allies, now insecure, became unwilling to submit to impotence. In consequence, the traditional American role of managing the nuclear deterrent for the alliance came into question, indeed, became a volatile issue.

In fact, of all the problems that plague the alliance, the problem of the control of nuclear weapons has probably been the most vexatious. The reason is that the issue of control of nuclear weapons impinges on a national freedom of

action during peacetime, which is only indirectly related to the perception of military threats and feelings of national security, for also encompassed by this issue are the important matters of political prestige and influence. American opposition (indeed joint super-power opposition) to further nuclear proliferation affects every nation in NATO that can afford and might want to pursue scientific knowledge, develop technical skills, and establish industrial capabilities in the nuclear field. It is obvious that given an alternative, no nation will happily give up its freedom of choice in vital matters over the long term or entrust its destiny to the dictates of another nation or even to an alliance of nations, unless there is a total community of interests among allies such that the national interests of one are unquestionably the same as the interests of the other allies. Unfortunately, such unanimity of interests does not characterize the North Atlantic Alliance. This fact was dramatically brought home by France's withdrawal from NATO, a manifestation of Charles de Gaulle's desire for a Europe freed of American hegemony. The core of the issue of nuclear control was summed up by President de Gaulle when he said:

For France to deprive herself of the means capable of dissuading the adversary from a possible attack . . . would mean that she would confide her defense and therefore her existence, and in the end her policy to a foreign and, for that matter, an uncertain protector.⁶

Thus every scheme that has been advanced to solve the problem of nuclear control has foundered on the basic issue of national sovereignty. Furthermore, it is this requirement

of the smaller NATO allies that has conflicted with the pursuance of the third concept of American strategy: arms control. The bilateral nature of American attempts to seek some sort of arrangement with the Soviet Union on armaments has been regarded with particular distrust by France and Germany. Determined to develop nuclear weapons of her own, France rejected the limited test ban and refused to participate in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Germany, on the other hand, has strongly opposed arms control concepts for disengagement and nuclear free zones because they would tend to give recognition to the partition of Germany. The German Federal Republic has also regarded the negotiation of an anti-proliferation treaty with extreme suspicion, as it might prevent her participation in nuclear policy matters that have to do with her vital security interests. Although the Federal Republic did finally comply with the Non-proliferation Treaty, she applauded the treaty application of a "three-month escape clause."

The principles at issue in discussions of nuclear control and national nuclear forces were concisely stated by Henry A. Kissinger as follows:

NATO's nuclear dilemma has developed because there is an increasing inconsistency between the technical requirements of strategy and the political imperatives of the nation-state. Three factors have produced the difficulty: (1) the need for centralized control of military operations, (2) the desire of each major ally to have substantial influence on common decisions, especially during crises, in defining the casus belli and in participating in the planning of the controlled operations foreseen by the doctrine of flexible response and (3) the wish of the major allies to share in the prestige and the political power which control of nuclear weapons confers or is thought to confer.

While the problems involved in nuclear control have been set forth in principle, it will be instructive to examine in more detail one proposal advanced to alleviate the dissension within NATO over this issue. This particular proposal attempted to permit the West European nations to share in the ownership and the planning of an integrated NATO strategic nuclear force. Though now a dead issue, a case study of The Multilateral Force (MLF) should greatly illuminate this query into what American hegemony in the North Atlantic Alliance is all about.

The MLF: A Case Study

From the first years of the nuclear age, through the period of the MLF, and continuing to the present day, American officials of five administrations have been caught between their wish to enhance allied unity and cooperation through sharing nuclear materials, information, and weapons control and their fears that such sharing would promote the independent creation and autonomous physical control of nuclear capabilities among a second generation of aspiring powers. From the American point of view, there is antinomy between effective coalition diplomacy and the dictates of military technology. The principal attempt made so far to come to grips with the problem of nuclear management in the alliance was the United States proposal for an MLF.

The MLF emerged in February, 1963 as America's major effort to restore the cohesion of NATO, which had eroded in the early sixties concurrently with the loosening of the former rigid bipolar ordering of international relations. This change in the sixties had led to the growth of substantial European resentment of the "benevolent" American hegemony so anxiously sought in the immediate postwar period. A natural intensification of traditional nation-state behavior within the Atlantic pact followed in the wake of the politico-economic resurgence of West Europe and the decline of previous perceptions of an acute Soviet military threat.

To review its principal features, the MLF was to have consisted of some twenty-five missile-carrying surface vessels,

each armed with eight Polaris nuclear missiles, jointly owned by the participating governments and manned by crews of mixed nationality subject to a denationalized operational command. All major decisions were to have been made by an executive committee representing the principal contributing countries. Voting rights in this committee were to have reflected financial contributions and were to have been so arranged that the United States, Britain and Germany (and France if it were ever to join) would each have a veto. Thus basic decisions about strategy and the use of the force would have been by unanimity of the principal members.⁸

The roots of the tension which eventually led to the MLF proposal go back as far as 1954. In 1954 European allied NATO forces had no tactical atomic weapons. The restrictions of the American Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (the MacMahon Act), although primarily directed against the intelligence-gathering threat of Communist powers, also forbade the sharing of atomic weapons and information among close NATO partners. By June, 1954, high administration officials were testifying before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the need to amend the 1946 act. At that time Secretary Dulles admitted to a:

. . .growing feeling of almost futility on the part of our NATO allies unless they can get more information than they now have about tactical weapons. They know we have them, and they know the enemy has them, and they stand in between with no knowledge at all at the present time; . . .it is extremely difficult to retain the morale of the NATO forces. . . under present conditions.⁹

Thus was born the liberalized Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

While the new act permitted the sharing of additional

information on the external nature of the newly developed atomic weapons, it also stipulated that the Secretary of Defense was not permitted to assign weapons to an ally for training unless they were continually in the custody of American nationals. The atomic warheads themselves were to remain under the unilateral physical control of Americans at all times.

Illustrative of the "guidance" offered by the Americans in the forming of NATO strategy was the "new look" NATO doctrine adopted in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December, 1954. Essentially this meeting simply rubber-stamped American strategy into NATO strategy by authorizing SHAPE to base its military planning on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be employed by the West in potential future conflict situations, regardless of their use or non-use by an aggressor. At the same time, the Council refrained from recommending any meaningful increase in NATO ground forces for the following year.

Unfortunately, the amending of the MacMahon Act in 1954 and the adoption by NATO of a tactical nuclear strategy did not appease the European allies, for although these moves greatly facilitated allied training in the means of nuclear-age warfare, these measures were inadequate for the solution of what were basically psychological-political problems of the alliance. Indeed, these initial attempts seemed only to encourage the major European allies in their desire for a larger voice in Atlantic nuclear affairs and for a more substantive degree of physical control of these weapons.

The impact of American insistence on maintaining unilateral physical control of the nuclear weapons systems was assessed by Ralph J. Thomson as follows:

This American exclusivity served to endanger Western cohesion by relegating the allies to a continuing position of near-total dependence upon Washington's nuclear decisions. Two allies sought costly alternatives of developing their own nuclear forces, thus giving priority to the creation of strategic weapons which would purportedly deliver a maximum of power and prestige for limited financial outlays, rather than to tactical nuclear capabilities which would have been relevant to NATO's new doctrinal perspective.¹⁰

In the late summer and autumn of 1957, revolutionary Soviet technological advances greatly stimulated European allied demands for a reduction of nuclear dependence on the United States. These, in turn, led to major new American initiatives concerning nuclear sharing within NATO. Fears of an impending "missile gap" prompted an American decision to place IRBM and MRBM sites in allied states whose territories were within range of the potential aggressor. At the same time, American officials were confronted by a need to compensate for the attendant risks run by any European partners who were willing to accept the potential nuclear "lightening-rod" bases. Thus they promised major new nuclear sharing concessions for participating allies.

At the end of 1957 the Eisenhower Administration presented a formal American plan concerning the development of IRBM launching sites in Europe to the North Atlantic Council. This plan offered American assurances of bilateral decision procedures governing all employment of the missiles as well as a significantly expedited expansion of European-based nuclear

warhead stockpiles in exchange for allied agreement to accept such bases. By the close of this conference, only Turkey and Britain had firmly committed themselves to the installation of missile bases under the American proposal. Under heavy American pressure, Italy later accepted joint participation in the program. These arrangements came to be known as the "double-veto" or "dual-control" system.¹¹

Just as the 1954 Atomic Energy Act did not solve NATO's inter-allied problems, neither did the 1957 plan prove to be the alliance's panacea. Dissatisfaction persisted within the alliance concerning the management of the nuclear deterrent. Thus by 1958 it was deemed necessary to further amend the MacMahon Act. It was argued by the Eisenhower Administration that a failure to accommodate allied complaints and to encourage allied collaboration under American tutelage would be to accept political-military parochialism and nuclear proliferation. These pleadings, nevertheless, produced only conservative amendments to the act. The act continued to stipulate that:

No cooperation with any nation or regional defense organization. . . shall be undertaken until. . . the Committee has approved. . . a guarantee by the cooperating party that any such agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose.¹²

One section of the 1958 Amendment did, however, open up possibilities of direct American assistance toward allied production of nuclear weapons. This section said:

. . . the President may authorize the Commission, with the assistance of the Department of Defense,

to cooperate with another nation and. . . to exchange with that nation restricted data concerning atomic weapons; provided that communication of restricted data to that nation is necessary to improve its atomic weapon design, development of fabrication capability and provided that nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons.¹³

In the year following the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, further pressure for sharing the physical control of the United States nuclear capability within NATO and for the development of modern nuclear weapons systems on European soil was applied by American General Lauris Norstad, acting in his capacity as SACEUR. General Norstad encouraged consideration of the idea that the Treaty Organization itself be assigned control of a sizable quantity of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Thus NATO would become, in effect, the "fourth nuclear power." In a speech in December, 1959 Norstad asked:

How do we meet a growing, but still somewhat confused and conflicting desire among our European allies for a broader sharing in the control of nuclear weapons? How can the alliance as a whole be assured that such weapons will be available to them in all reasonable circumstances for their defense, the defense of Europe?¹⁴

By February, 1960, military-technological developments had again placed special urgency on NATO nuclear sharing issues, for in that month France successfully tested her first atomic device in the Sahara. Having accomplished this feat, French pressure for American assistance under the provisions of the MacMahon Act increased. Two weeks following the French explosion General Norstad renewed his suggestion for a NATO nuclear force and announced that the governments

of France, the United Kingdom and the United States had given tacit support to a specific proposal for the establishment of a mobile multinational NATO unit to be equipped with nuclear as well as conventional armaments. The proposed unit would be composed initially of a brigade from each of the three states, with the understanding that the other NATO powers would subsequently be invited to take part. However, Washington's tacit approval of the project was immediately qualified by the administration, saying that the United States would continue to control unilaterally all nuclear warheads in the new NATO brigades. (Admittedly, this was probably prompted by Russian warnings that the formation of such a force would cloud prospects for successful discussions at the coming summit meeting in May.)

Thus the period of the late fifties brought the United States and her Atlantic allies to the realization of the political, military, and psychological desirability, if not necessity, of reforming the old NATO nuclear sharing guidelines. The several proposals to this effect and the diplomacy surrounding them led by 1960 to a specific American plan for a multilateral nuclear fleet within NATO. This proposal was largely the work of a private study headed by Professor Robert Bowie of Harvard, who had been commissioned by the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. The recommendations of the Bowie Study were the first specific formulation of the Multilateral Force Project subsequently to be advocated by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Bowie Report

espoused two major objectives. First, it encouraged the augmentation of conventional allied military capabilities in West Europe in order to make possible a confrontation of potential aggressive threats without automatic commitment to nuclear weapons. Second, it called for the fulfillment of NATO's MRBM requirement through the allocation of ten to twelve nuclear Polaris submarines to the NATO command.

These suggestions were formalized in an offer by Secretary of State Herter in December, 1960. Herter's proposal called for the creation of a medium-range ballistic missile force for NATO under multilateral control. As an initial step in the long-term development of this unit, the United States offered to commit to the Alliance by 1963 five missile-firing submarines with a total armament of eighty Polaris missiles. The offer was contingent upon the European allies' reaching agreement on a "multilateral system" of political management and the expectation that the NATO powers would purchase a further one hundred medium-range missiles (probably also of the Polaris type), to be placed on other ships for the disposition of SACEUR.

The advent of the Kennedy Administration momentarily interrupted progress toward a multilateral force. Kennedy did not rush into an endorsement of either the Herter-Bowie or Norstad concepts. The new administration undertook a thorough review of NATO in all its aspects. For this purpose a high level interagency commission of inquiry and evaluation was formed under the direction of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The specifics of the Acheson Report were never

released, but in any case, it resulted in a year-long period of dormancy for the MLF project.¹⁵

In the spring of 1962, the NATO Council formed a Nuclear Committee. This body was expected to provide an institutional setting within which the Atlantic nuclear powers could discuss and coordinate their respective strategic policies. The success of the new committee seemed assured when Secretary of Defense McNamara supplied the Ministers' Council in Athens in early May with data on numbers, location and capacities of American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. McNamara coupled this with an American offer of "joint contingency planning" for the purpose of creating guidelines governing the employment of these weapons by both American and European forces. This he hoped would eliminate any need for the creation of a separate multilateral force within the Alliance. The American offer also contained implied assurance that the entire American nuclear submarine fleet would be pledged to the Alliance as soon as it could be developed to its projected forty-one vessel capability. In effect, however, the Polaris submarine would remain a part of the U. S. Navy inasmuch as the fleet would merely be transferred to SACIANT, an officer who was simultaneously Commander of the U. S. Atlantic fleet.

Ralph J. Thomson commented on the problem-solving potential of these "Athens Guidelines":

Whereas the Athens deliberations may have genuinely bolstered short-run confidence in America's control of Western nuclear capabilities, the more deep-seated psychological, political and military dissonances elaborated among allies previously could not be erased by the ringing declarations and non-substantive institutional formulations of the May Ministerial Meetings.

Still, by mid-1962, it had become evident that although the Pentagon preferred to see all nuclear capabilities of the Atlantic Treaty Organization retained under sole American trusteeship, it was constrained to accept the multilateral force concept as a ~~second~~-best alternative since the persistence of national strike forces and the prospects of further nuclear proliferation within NATO had become continuing considerations. In actual fact, the joint force concept seemed relatively innocuous inasmuch as proposals called for Washington's retention of a veto over its ultimate employment.

The official pronouncements indicating Washington's arrival at this stage of thinking came in November, 1962.

... should other NATO nations so desire, we are ready to give serious consideration to the creation of a genuinely multilateral medium-range ballistic missile force fully coordinate with the other deterrent forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is not for us--indeed, it would be out of keeping with the spirit of Atlantic partnership--to dictate how such a force should be manned, financed or organized. But it is a proper responsibility of the United States, which has had so much experience in the nuclear field, to make available to others our information and ideas with respect to the characteristics and capabilities of a multilateral force. And we are now in the process of doing so.¹⁷

Dean Rusk reiterated these ideas, saying:

We have expressed our willingness, if our allies wish to do so, to consider a multilateral nuclear force which would not be so heavily dependent upon the United States alone. Now we have not ourselves put forward a precise plan in this regard. This is something that our friends across the Atlantic would presumably wish to do if they conclude what it is they would like to propose in this field.¹⁸

While at the regular NATO ministerial conference in December 1962, the United States took no initiative with

respect to the MLF, a week later at Nassau, the United States and Great Britain decided to subscribe part of their national nuclear forces to a NATO multilateral force. Indeed, the first weeks of 1963 witnessed the transformation of the MLF concept from the status of one idea among many to a prime objective of American NATO policy. Earlier detailed plans for a joint NATO force were revised in certain particulars and dispatched with high-level U. S. emissaries to Europe. The two major previous conditions for American assistance in developing an integrated Atlantic nuclear force--substantial allied conventional build-up and advance European agreement on an integrated control plan--were dropped by March, 1963. This new sense of urgency in Washington was further evidenced by the abandonment of the previous policy of waiting upon European suggestions for a concrete joint force project. The assignment of Ambassador Livingston Merchant to expedite MLF negotiations as well as the instructions to American representatives to press the MLF on the Atlantic partners as the most promising avenue available in the 1960's for the amelioration of NATO's problem and the restoration of allied unity witnessed this fact. In fact, there was a blatant inconsistency between the statements of Ball and Rusk and the actions of the United States. In weighing these active American initiatives against conflicting American rhetoric, Alastair Buchan concluded:

In reality, Ball and Rusk were being somewhat modest and disingenuous as the United States had by then a plan for a multilateral force which she was about to insist that her allies consider.¹⁹

Thus American spokesmen presented the MLF as a step toward meeting European desires for sharing nuclear control. One of the principal arguments advanced in behalf of the multilateral project proclaimed its ability to allow the European allies an immediate share in the military planning and disposition of a meaningful strategic capability. Much was made of the substantially enhanced influence MLF participants could expect in the evolution not only of United States military strategy but also of American foreign policy. Such increased diplomatic leverage was put forth as an almost inevitable concomitant of joint ownership, shared physical custody and technical access associated with the project.

The flowering of American enthusiasm for the MLF became even greater after July, 1963 and the signing of the Moscow Treaty on Atmospheric Nuclear Testing. With the conclusion of this treaty, Washington turned from its preoccupation with arms control toward a renewed acceleration of negotiations for an integrated Atlantic nuclear fleet. This seemed all the more urgent inasmuch as the signing of the partial test ban treaty had greatly unsettled the leaders of the Federal Republic who feared that German national interests would suffer in what they considered to be a developing Soviet-American rapprochement. Realizing the discontent within the Federal Republic, Washington feared the twin threats of a German national nuclear program and Franco-German collaboration in the nuclear field.

Thus the MLF came into full bloom as the focal point of Washington's NATO policy during 1963 and continued in this position of high priority throughout most of 1964. Even the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963 failed to disrupt the momentum behind the priority assigned to the MLF in Washington's Atlantic Policy. Yet, despite American fervor for the multilateral force during this period, the MLF proposal failed for want of a sufficient European consensus, and in the end, even the United States withdrew its active support: Only the German Federal Republic was an early and enthusiastic advocate of the MLF scheme. Greece, Turkey and Italy agreed in principle to participate. Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands joined the other countries in a study of the technical feasibility of mixed-manning. France refused any degree of participation.²⁰

It is perhaps the greatest irony of the MLF case that while the plan was proposed to restore Allied cohesion, it instead aggravated the situation by becoming itself an additional element of discord. This project, which involved giving Germany access to nuclear weapons, brought on almost instinctive reactions of disquiet, which were magnified by the hints from Washington and Bonn during negotiations, that, if necessary, the United States and the Federal Republic might establish the MLF bilaterally. Moreover, French hostility compounded the uneasiness of almost all the other allies. In short, the MLF plan failed in its attempt to resolve the antinomy between effective coalition diplomacy and what Washington considered vital dictates of military technology.

The MLF policy heard its death knell as Washington began to turn its attention increasingly toward South East Asia. It was officially announced in early 1965 that the special MLF bureau under the leadership of Gerard Smith had been disbanded. Realizing, in retrospect, that the MLF effort was basically counterproductive, it is difficult to find kind words for an epitaph to that policy. Just how misdirected the MLF attempt to heal the wounds of NATO was summed up by Henry A. Kissinger as follows:

Originated to fulfill SACEUR's military requirement, pressed as a counter to a French challenge, the MLF stands in danger of compounding every problem it was supposed to solve. It has prevented a reconsideration of the strategic missions that gave rise to the military requirement. Rather than heal the rift in the Alliance, the MLF is likely to multiply divisions. There is something absurd about trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by bringing the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear field, often with only their reluctant assent. It makes no sense to attempt to revitalize NATO with a project which, because of the opposition of France and other Allies, will have to be set up outside of NATO. It is contradictory to advocate European political unity while urging a scheme which is certain to produce a rift between France and the Federal Republic.²¹

Certainly it is obvious that the MLF scheme did not hold the cure for NATO's ailments in the early sixties. As perceptive as Mr. Kissinger's observations were in 1965, however, they seemed to miss the most glaring point in the lesson of the MLF: the MLF scheme failed because it sought to provide only the illusion of participation without the substance of control. Professor Lawrence Kaplan had the advantage of time and retrospective analysis on his side when he pointedly commented on the significance of the MLF

negotiations in the life of the North Atlantic Alliance. It *is* therefore useful to conclude with Professor Kaplan's analysis:

The trouble with the MLF in 1960 or in 1969 is the trouble with the alliance in 1970. On the one hand, there was Europe's reluctance to expend the large amounts of money required to participate in the MLF at a time when Europe had lost its fears of a Soviet invasion. On the other hand, there was the undeniable fact that no matter how much money each partner offered, the United States would still have an exclusive voice in the actual decision to use the Polaris missile; decision-making was not a matter of sharing (emphasis added).²²

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

Anglo-American Relations

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is primarily a defensive alliance. Yet even though it is above all else a military alliance, it is also an inter-governmental organization. The primary task of NATO is to draw up joint defense plans to provide for the best possible use of NATO forces without delay in the event of war, though this military preparedness is aimed above all at preventing war. A secondary task of the alliance is a political one: to provide a forum for the consideration of and consultation on all political problems of relevance to its members or to the alliance as a whole. Although the alliance in its early years was primarily concerned with the need to establish an organization for efficient collective self-defense, political issues were discussed from the outset, for among allies, controversy is inevitable, though it is rarely concerned with strictly military issues. Even when the argument is ostensibly technical, the political element is nearly always present. Having reviewed the background of strategic controversy among the allies, it is logical to turn to the political issues related to the United States hegemonic role in NATO.

At the outset of the alliance, Britain, Germany and France, each in its own way, acquiesced in the formation of the Atlantic military bloc with its inherent American pre-

ponderance dictated by the United States nuclear monopoly. However, this original acceptance on the part of the major European powers has worn thin since NATO's creation in 1949. Commenting on this situation, David Calleo said:

. . . whatever the changes in NATO's decoration, the architectural pattern has remained hegemonic. So monolithic a style is not to everyone's taste. In particular, it has gradually lost appeal to the major European powers themselves. As a result, Britain and France, each in its own fashion, have taken their distance from America's nuclear hegemony in NATO, while Germany has grown increasingly restive within it.¹

An examination of this aspect of the American giant's relation to its pygmy allies is best begun with a look at the Anglo-American "Special Relationship." The contrast between the substance of that "relationship" in the immediate postwar years and in 1971 is indeed marked. The British might presumably have been postwar Europe's natural leaders, and yet they threw over their own European defense scheme, the Brussels Pact of 1948, in exchange for NATO. That Britain preferred her special partnership in the Atlantic Alliance to the leadership of Europe emphasizes the vital nature of the "Special Relationship" in 1949. In contrast to this vitality is the insignificance attributed to the "partnership," by the American government in particular, in 1971. When questioned on this point, in fact, an American spokesman directly admitted that the "Special Relationship" is being translated less and less into political decisions or financial moves but rather merely consists of unique ties of language and culture.²

World War II demonstrated enormous resource differences between Great Britain and the United States. As the United States accepted greater international responsibilities, Britain was relegated to a secondary role. In searching for means with which to maintain at best a degree of influence over American policy, the British found a tool in military policy. Significantly, the British made their decision to produce atomic weapons in 1946. During World War II Britain had cooperated with the United States in the Manhattan Project, and it was expected at the end of the war that Britain would either receive atomic weapons or share in their control. However, these views were not shared by the American Congress, which passed the MacMahon Act in 1946, making it impossible for the United States to furnish her allies with either weapons or data. The Atlee Government reacted by initiating an independent development program. Such a program would enable Britain to meet the American definition of great power status implicit in the MacMahon Act, which promised assistance to those nations that made substantial independent progress in the development of atomic weapons. When the British were successful in producing their own nuclear weapons in 1952, it was not seen as an attempt to dissociate themselves from the alliance but rather as an effort to gain a special status within it. Since Britain had initiated the United States into nuclear weapons technology, the Americans felt constrained to admit them to a nuclear special relationship.³

Throughout the 1950's the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" was a visibly viable partnership within the Atlantic Alliance. Certainly there was reason for a powerful British voice in Washington so long as the intense Communist frenzy held sway in the United States during the 1950's. Sir Anthony Eden played an important part in restraining John Foster Dulles' zealous anti-Communism. But when John F. Kennedy became President in 1961, he made it clear that the new Washington policy was peaceful coexistence with the Communist world. With this change of policy came a change of Britain's role in the "Special Relationship." That Britain's role in the Alliance had declined became clear when President Kennedy condescendingly agreed to visit London to report to the Prime Minister after his talks with Khrushchev in Vienna in June, 1961. Britain's position was not improved during the Johnson Administration during which time London sought without avail to modify America's Vietnam policy in return for loyal British support of that policy.⁴

The two events that underlined the decline of an Anglo-American mutuality of interests most vividly were the Suez Crisis and the Cuban Confrontation. The former manifested diametrically opposed military and political interests as well as demonstrating the end of Britain's capacity for major independent action. In the Cuban crisis the British government was skeptical about the "quarantine" and angry at not having been consulted. The successful termination of the conflict no doubt served to allay British concern, but, nevertheless, the affair reminded both countries of their

different approaches to international questions.

By 1962 the chief remaining symbol of the special Anglo-American relationship was in the nuclear field. An amendment to the United States Atomic Energy Act in 1954 permitted United States assistance to the British nuclear program. This corrected an inequity in the original law which, despite close war-time collaboration in research between Britain and the United States, prohibited the sharing of nuclear information with foreign countries. American technology was also made available for the development of delivery vehicles for the British retaliatory force. No such assistance was extended to any other ally.

However, when the Kennedy Administration took office, both President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara publicly expressed their disapproval of independent nuclear forces. Moreover, the Kennedy Administration was supported by the British Opposition, the British Labour Party. The ensuing cancellation of the Skybolt program in December 1962 served to emphasize the futility of Britain's aspirations to military autonomy. In reaction to the domestic uproar aroused in Britain by cancelling their "independent deterrent" program, a conference between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, which had been scheduled originally to review the world situation after the Cuban missile crisis, was transformed into a redefinition of nuclear relationships. The Nassau Agreement was the result.

At Nassau the British accepted the American offer of an advanced-design delivery vehicle for a sea-based strategic

striking force in lieu of Skybolt. But if the purpose of having Skybolt had been to maintain an independent British striking force, the language of Nassau, whatever interpretation be put upon some ambiguous phraseology, undermined that purpose. The new British strategic force was both more dependent on the United States and more committed to NATO than the old one had been.⁵

The bilateral action at Nassau produced a chain reaction within the alliance, which, in turn, had repercussions upon Anglo-American relations. The French found in the Nassau Agreement a plausible basis for reaffirming their own plans for an independent nuclear deterrent and thereby dealt a further blow to the idea of balanced, collective forces. The French action raised the question of how long before the Germans would want to follow suit. To deal with these developments, the Americans began to push their specific plan for the MLF.

British opinion on the MLF while divided, was in no way favorable to American urgings. Significantly, the United States seemed reluctant to exert itself in order to placate the British. In fact, C. L. Sulzberger reported that Defense Minister von Hassel had suggested in the summer of 1963 that an Anglo-American atomic-submarine contingent be attached to a multilateral force, but the Americans appeared not to be interested. The United States claimed that it would accent a "special relationship," which was not desired.⁶

Thus the credibility of the Anglo-American "special relationship" dwindled considerably in the sixties, to the point, in fact, of consisting merely of ties of language and

culture by the early seventies. What conclusions can be drawn, then, concerning the significance of the American role in the "Special Relationship" and, then, of that relationship in the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole? In the first place, it seems obvious that the "special relationship" has never had the same psychological significance for the United States that it did for Britain. As the postwar period progressed, many Americans came to believe that Britain was claiming influence out of proportion to its power. Consequently, the Americans pressed Britain to substitute close association with Europe for the special ties across the Atlantic.

The latter is, in fact, what happened. Since the 1966 Defense Review, Britain has gravitated more and more towards being a "European nation." The grounds of British policy have shifted away from the older notion that a choice would have to be made between the United States and Europe. It can no doubt be said that Washington's preference for a "Britain-in-Europe" has strongly influenced the change of direction of British policy. P. M. Rosecrance aptly described the new position of Britain vis-à-vis Europe in the following passage:

. . . To be sure Britain can no longer serve as "broker" between alliance partners in Europe and America, and the United States has too many bilateral contacts for that to be either useful or significant. . . . As a member of the Common Market, she would inevitably exert pressure on behalf of open-ended trading relationships. A Europe with British participation would be more outward looking, economically, politically, and militarily, than a Europe of the Six alone. Britain-in-Europe would be more likely to reinsure the Atlantic Alliance for the indefinite future than an exclusive continental combination.⁷

In terms of specific implications for NATO of this American pressure on Britain, it seems fair to cite the increased

British commitment of conventional troops announced in the 1970 Defense White Paper as evidence of a decisive step towards implicating herself more completely in the affairs of Europe. This step towards increasing conventional commitments in Europe reflects simultaneously Britain's realization of her impotence vis-à-vis her independent deterrent's acting as a lever of Washington policy.

By way of final comment on Anglo-American relations, it seems appropriate to introduce one further aspect of the "Special Relationship," which will be more fully discussed in the section on overall European-American relations.

. . . the "special relationship" lasted long enough to bring about a number of illusions in Allied relationships. Where Britain tended to exaggerate its special influence in Washington, the United States may have overestimated the extent of Britain's pliability. It became an axiom of United States policy that Britain's entry into a supranational Europe would be a guarantee of Atlantic partnership.⁸

German-American Relations

Germany is a divided country, defeated in World War II, and still painfully burdened by the atrocities of Hitler. Militarily exposed, Germany was and is greatly dependent upon the other members of NATO for her security, especially upon the United States. The political instrument for West German rearmament and entry into NATO is contained in the 1954 Paris Protocols Amending the Brussels Treaty of 1948. Of particular relevance are the provisions that incorporated Chancellor Adenauer's unilateral pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons or any other related armaments on West German soil. However, West Germany did not renounce either the possession or the use of nuclear weapons. In any case, in return for this pledge, Germany's Western allies committed themselves to support eventual reunification of Germany. The weak political position of Germany at the time left her no alternative but to actively seek the closest integration within the framework of the Alliance. Territorial security had to be assured, and the other major goal--German reunification--had to take second place.

These two primary objectives--security and reunification--create a quandary for German foreign policy. Germany sees her security interests served best by close association with the United States. The Germans realize that, insofar as events in Germany may provide a casus belli or trigger armed conflict with the Soviet Union, they would much prefer American military backing to the guarantees of France and Great Britain. But

the Germans also realize that the goal of reunification can be advanced in the long run only through seeking closer ties with her European allies and rapprochement with the Communist satellite states. Because of this, Germany entered the Franco-German pact in January 1963. And even more important, because of this second goal, Willy Brandt has launched his active Eastern policy, Ostpolitik.

Despite the hearty protestations from German Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt claiming that present German policy represents a "coherent continuum" with the past and that "security efforts and probes toward the East are inseparable,"⁹ it does not seem to stretch the evidence to view Ostpolitik, at least partially, as a product of a certain restiveness in German-American relations. Indeed, some Germans connected with the Ostpolitik quietly acknowledge to their Western friends that the real motive for the West German initiative is rooted in declining West German confidence in the stability and commitment of America.¹⁰

German uneasiness dates from the early 1960's when it became apparent that the Cold War might thaw into a broad Soviet-American understanding--a development that presented Europe in general and Germany in particular not only with new opportunities, but also new risks. In the earlier Adenauer era, the Germans, despairing of any reasonable response from the Russians, were contented enough to wait for better days under the cover of America's nuclear and diplomatic hegemony. But growing uneasiness over Berlin, the perceived "missile gap," and the Kennedy Administration's desire to end the Cold War

led Adenauer to fear that Germany's best interests were not foremost in America's designs. In response, Germany turned from America's Atlantic hegemony, not as a result of re-viving aspirations to great power status, but rather from fear of being caught in the toils of a Soviet-American entente negotiated at Germany's expense. The MLF scheme was brought forth, in large measure, to ameliorate German fears, and to head off any German movement for a nuclear force of her own.

For the purposes of discussion, it is possible to distinguish five separate periods of German-American relations within the broader NATO context. The first period began with the 1954 admission of the Federal Republic into NATO and lasted to the 1959-1960 and 1961-1962 Berlin crises. This period was characterized by very friendly feelings coupled with a decidedly hegemonic American style. The years between the Berlin crises and the American MLF proposal compose the second period. These were years of an atmosphere of malaise between Bonn and Washington. Throughout 1962, specifically, American-German relations remained wary, while the Federal Republic moved ever closer to an intimate association with France, culminating in the 1963 Franco-German Treaty of Collaboration. This treaty prompted the third period, which saw a deliberate American policy of wooing the Federal Republic away from its French ties: hence the MLF negotiations. This period can be seen as ending with the burial of the MLF scheme. Relations were so close during this third period, in fact, that it was thought by other allies that a special United

States-German relationship was developing.¹¹ However, after 1965, German-American relations normalized, and balance was restored to the bilateral relations of the United States and its NATO allies. This period of relative calm lasted until approximately 1970. In the last year or so, two new variables have threatened to once again destabilize German-American relations. The first was the renewal of discussions in Washington regarding troop reductions in Europe (the Mansfield Resolution). The second was, and continues to be, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. Indeed, this present period may come to be known as the period of Ostpolitik.

Regarding the first issue--the troop reduction proposal--the uneasiness of the Bonn government was expressed by Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt:

It is with intense concern that we follow the course of events in the United States and Canada, and the development of thoughts suggesting a lessening of foreign policy commitments of the United States, in particular concerning Europe. Past experience gives rise to the hope that notwithstanding the pressing domestic issues a wide consensus will emerge to reaffirm the responsibilities of the United States as a vital and fundamental backbone for the strategic balance. . . . Moreover, substantial U. S. withdrawals would sorely undermine public confidence not only in the reliability of the American commitment but also in the basic feasibility of European defense. An opinion poll recently conducted in West Germany bears this out. Sixty-six percent of those polled--and seventy-nine percent of all Bundeswehr soldiers--felt that without American troops Germany would be overrun in the event of Communist aggression. Thus, an American pull-out might indeed cause a psychological landslide and impel a despondent Western Europe toward its first major re-orientation since the end of World War II.¹²

As suggested earlier, it does not seem unreasonable to find a connection between the concern of the Federal Republic

vis-à-vis the reliability of American preponderance for security and the independent Eastern policy being pursued by the Brandt government. Indeed, Brandt's policy seems a logical reaction to the "Nixon Doctrine," which essentially stated that the United States is going to take a less activist role on the world stage and is going to encourage individual countries to do more for their own defense themselves, rather than relying on U. S. military aid.

Ostpolitik has as its goal the normalization of relations between Bonn and Eastern Europe, opening the way for an easing of the military threat and the growth of trade and cultural contacts between East and West. The hope of its advocates in the West is that this interpenetration will lead to an evolution of the Communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe toward greater political freedom, and in particular to a solution of the problem of the two German states. The fear of its critics is that it will lead to a greater Soviet influence over Western Europe, the erosion of NATO, and a gradual disintegration of the foundations of West European unity.

Western critics of Ostpolitik, especially American critics, have recently become more vocal. Mr. George Ball aired doubts over where Brandt's policy was leading him. He said that he was worried that West Germany's advances to the Soviet Union might lead to diplomatic adventures and place the western alliance in jeopardy. In particular, Mr. Ball criticized Brandt for failing to coax any serious concessions out of Mr. Brezhnev. It has also been argued by critics that the Soviet Union's tactic is to try to drive a wedge between

West Germany and its allies. The Soviet Union is holding out the prospect of better relations and more trade with West Germany, so the argument runs, if Brandt is willing to deal directly with Ulbricht over the question of the access routes to Berlin. This would be ignoring the rights of West Germany's allies.¹³

Besides the problems connected with each of these issues in themselves, as has been pointed out, Ostpolitik and the strength of the American commitment to Europe are vitally intertwined. Specifically, Brandt is concerned that a premature cut in U. S. troops would undermine his efforts to negotiate a mutual force reduction with the Warsaw Pact nations. The progress of Ostpolitik depends upon the present balance of power between East and West.

What conclusions can be drawn, then, regarding the harmonious American role in relations between West Germany and the United States? First, it is not so much the preponderant American role in itself as it is the vulnerable position and status of the Federal Republic that give German-American relations their distinctive coloring. In the face of its vulnerability, it is to the American giant that Germans have looked in postwar years for both security from a threatening East Europe and acceptance in a suspicious West Europe. It is, therefore, the West Germans who are most affected by any changes in the nature of the American role in Europe. It is the Germans who would bear the brunt of a unilateral reduction

of the American commitment to Europe.* In short, the hegemonic American role in NATO holds a paradox for Germany:

(1) As long as American strength permeates the alliance, it distracts West European fears of a revived Germany and thus decreases its vulnerability in this respect. (2) But, at the same time, the very essence of German dependence upon this American role increases its vulnerability: hence such autonomous efforts as Brandt's Ostpolitik.

*It was this realization that prompted Brandt's trip to the United States in the spring of 1970, at which time the German Chancellor secured the promise of President Nixon that the present U. S. troop level would be maintained until at least mid-1971.

Franco-American Relations

In sharp contrast to the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" and to close German-American relations, have been the continuous conflicts which have characterized relations between the United States and France. The following account so well captures the essence of Franco-American rivalry that it seems futile to try to improve upon its words.

. . . Now debating the wisdom of negotiating with the Soviets, now contesting the role of nuclear weapons, always disputing the future organization of Europe and the structure of the Alliance, the two countries have sometimes acted as if each had a psychological need to use the other as a foil.

Each side has developed elaborate theories concerning the evil designs of its opponent. French spokesmen have charged that a primary goal of the United States policy is to keep its hand free for some super-Yalta--a strictly bilateral settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union. American commentators have dismissed French policy as reflecting nothing but outdated nationalism and the illusion of grandeur of a bitter man who cannot forget past slights, real or fancied. French critics have accused the United States of seeking to maintain its dominant position by disguising its aspirations behind high-sounding words about an Atlantic Community whose practical consequence will be to dissolve Europe's identity. Leading Americans have replied by emphasizing the futility of seeking to base policy on past glory, and they have accused De Gaulle of trying to identify European unity with French hegemony.

The ironical aspect of the dispute is that both protagonists profess the same objectives. France and the United States avow the goal of European unity. Both insist that their policy will lead to closer Atlantic cooperation. Each side argues that its policy will cause the Communist dictatorships to become more tractable in the long run and thus return the Soviet Union to the community of nations.

It could be thought, then, that the dispute is primarily one of tactics. In fact, the controversy goes deeper. At issue are two conflicting conceptions of international order, two different views of the historical process, two variant visions of the future. What gives the controversy its tragic quality is that each approach might have succeeded but for the existence of the other.¹⁴

Among the prewar great powers, France, after Germany, suffered the greatest loss of status and prestige from the war. And the postwar Atlantic Alliance offered France, among all the Europeans, the least chance to recoup. France's dim prospects were blamed in part on America's refusal to take the French seriously. While the British could find consolation in an Anglo-American special relation, institutionalized in the nuclear and intelligence liaisons, the French were denied nuclear partnership and felt themselves unsupported in their costly and humiliating colonial wars. But perhaps as humiliating as anything else was the low status allotted the French military in NATO in the parceling out of top commands--seven for the Americans, five for the British, and one for the French.

Charles de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes gave the impression that a powerful, self-confident France had been a permanent feature of the postwar landscape. Ironically, the forgotten governmental instability and spiritual malaise that preceded de Gaulle were the essential background ingredients of de Gaulle's policy. In any case, de Gaulle's nationalism was so greatly frustrated by the hegemonic American role in Europe, and his efforts to alter this situation were so intense, that by the mid-sixties the "Gaullist challenge" posed a real threat to the continuation of NATO. De Gaulle's attack on American hegemony in Europe involved a far-reaching strategy operating on several levels. For the purposes of this discussion, only the broad outlines of the Gaullist challenge will be treated.

The single most spectacular initiative on de Gaulle's part was at the military level. In March 1966 France-- though remaining a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and hence committed to its reciprocal obligation in the event of aggression--announced that it would withdraw from the integrated military command structure of NATO and demanded that allied military units, including NATO headquarters and SHAPE, be removed from French soil by April 1967. (It is significant to note that France's geographical insulation made it possible to renounce American protection while continuing to enjoy it.) To complement their withdrawal, the French promoted a military doctrine which both challenged the long-range adequacy of America's hegemonic military protection under the doctrine of flexible response and pointed to a European alternative.

De Gaulle's proposed alternative to the conventional option called for under flexible response was a "European" nuclear option. It was argued that the Russians would be less likely to gamble on a reaction to an invasion of Europe if Europeans, as well as their American allies, had independent nuclear forces. That the impact of this suggestion on the American self-image of its unique role as manager of the nuclear deterrent was negative is understandable.

In addition to their attack on America's military hegemony in NATO, the French have tried to rally a European bloc to define and assert collective European economic interests, especially in the trade and monetary fields. For example, de Gaulle promoted a tough European position in the Kennedy

Round. More notably, the French have demanded a fundamental revision of the postwar monetary system. The existing system has allowed the United States and Britain, because the dollar and the pound are reserve currencies, to run deficits as they please, and, in effect, has forced the Europeans to finance them.

A third front of de Gaulle's attack was political. This aspect of de Gaulle's policy aimed at using the rivalry of the superpowers to prevent their condominium, and, in fact, deflected the force of that rivalry toward the disruption of the blocs themselves. De Gaulle did his best to make the existing hegemonic bloc system intolerable for Americans and Russians alike, while simultaneously suggesting a pleasing alternative: "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." This system was to be sustained by an elaborate series of power balances and at least tacit reinsurance treaties.

In addition to attacking his image of world duopoly by disruptive tactics, it has been pointed out that de Gaulle pursued positive methods as well. For instance, the French have tried to demonstrate to Washington the practical usefulness of independent, medium-sized powers in preserving general world order. Examples are attempts of French diplomacy to play a mediating role in the Middle East and the outspoken French criticism of America in Vietnam, possibly aimed at playing the role of mediator there as well.¹⁶

Indications are that this more positive approach is the one being emphasized by the Pompidou government. However, such a conciliatory approach cannot blur the reality of Franco-

American relations: de Gaulle's policies sprang from French national interests; any strong French government is likely to remain Gaullist in the areas of the preceding discussion; and, consequently, American hegemony, perpetuated by the institutions of NATO, will continue to be resented and attacked by the French. Thus the future relations between France and the United States are likely to continue to be characterized by conflict between the American giant and the struggling French pygmy.

Overall European-American Relations:

(1) The Atlantic Framework

American policy towards Europe has been remarkably consistent from the time of the Marshall Plan in 1947 to the present. The foundation of that policy has been support for the idea of a unified Europe, based on the belief that the more intimately West Europeans would organize themselves, thereby attaining new heights of political and economic strength, the more optimistic the prospects for Atlantic Community development. Moreover, the more tightly the new unified Europe became associated with the United States, it was claimed, the more Europe herself would be likely to profit since the United States would concede far greater independent and substantive responsibilities to an integrated Europe than to the present amorphous coalition of nation-states.

Indeed, the integrationist cast of postwar American policy was observable as early as 1946 and 1947. By that time, leading Republicans John Foster Dulles, Governor Thomas E. Dewey and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg were claiming along with Democratic President Truman that American self-interest dictated encouragement of European steps toward unification. Bipartisan resolutions advocating the formation of outright federated European political structures were introduced into both Houses of Congress beginning in 1947, signaling a pressure that was to remain consistent in succeeding years.^{1,2}

The era of the MLF proposal brought renewed vigor to calls for a "Strong Partnership" relationship. In 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk re-emphasized the basic convictions of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in out-

lining the new Government's vision of a "Grand Design":

In 1947 the American Government decided that it would link the recovery of Europe to efforts at European unification. We chose quite consciously not to play a balance-of-power game with the nations of Europe but to build a strong partnership in the affairs of the West.¹⁸

One month later, Undersecretary of State, George Ball, the main European Affairs spokesman for the government at the time, stated this policy more explicitly:

As we have felt the increasing weight of the burdens and responsibilities of leadership--increased geometrically by the existence of a real and present danger from Communist ambitions--we have wished, sometimes wistfully, for a closer and stronger Atlantic partnership. Yet, a stronger partnership must almost by definition mean a collaboration-of-equals. When one partner possesses over fifty percent of the resources of an enterprise and the balance is distributed among sixteen or seventeen others, the relationship is unlikely to work very well. And so long as it consisted merely of nations small by modern standards, the potential for true partnership was always limited. It was in recognition of this fact that since the war we have consistently encouraged the powerful drive toward European integration. We have wanted a Europe united and strong--an equal partner committed to the same basic values and objectives of all Americans.¹⁹

In the years since the frenzy over the "Grand Design," domestic affairs and the Vietnam conflict have dictated an increasingly more passive American policy towards Europe. Despite accusations that the American commitment to Europe has been unaccompanied by much policy content, President Nixon did reiterate the traditional theme in his 1970 annual message when he said that the time has come for America to shift from a preponderant role toward more genuine partnership.²⁰

Thus the vision of an equal partnership between a "strong and united" Europe and the United States has been the official American doctrine since 1962, and less authoritatively for much longer. However, European-American relations are not a one-way street but rather an action-reaction setup. The framework of Atlantic relations has, therefore, been equally influenced by policies pursued by individual European states as by American policies.

For two decades now the idea of European unity has played a major role in the politics of the European Community. In the form which it was given by Jean Monnet and his followers in the early 1950's, the European idea holds that a supranational union is necessary for Western Europe's external security, internal political stability and economic health. This classical version of the European idea is not primarily concerned with unity as a means to European independence or status as a world power; its purpose is more functional than political. Insofar as it is concerned with external political relations, it sees union as a means to more effective cooperation with the United States. This is the brand of European unity espoused by the United States.

More recently, another way of conceiving the European idea surfaced, with the late Charles de Gaulle as its spokesman. It differs from the classical doctrine both in purpose and in means. Its purpose is more political than functional: to build a Western European grouping which would be independent of the United States--a third great power able to look out for its own interests and pursue its own ambitions on the world

stage. Although it would be called a political union, it would be, so far as foreign policy and military affairs are concerned, a simple coalition under French leadership. In economic matters it would consist of the EEC devoid of any promise of supranational authority.²¹

Obviously, the two concepts of Europe outlined above are so contradictory that one cannot think of resolving the dilemma by a compromise. Thus, even without going into a discussion of the prospects of the EEC's leading to a united Europe, it becomes evident that as long as one European state, be it a Gaullist France or a France under Georges Pompidou, advocates the notion of a Europe des Patries, European union in a "partnership of equals" will be limited to the realm of Washington rhetoric.

Despite the dim prospects of achieving a "United States of Europe," a twin issue of debate in European-American relations hinges upon this notion: the debate over an Atlantic Community versus an Atlantic Partnership of Equals. Proponents of the idea of an integrated "Atlantic Community" believe that there is an inherent contradiction in striving to expand the European Community simultaneously with increasing Atlantic unity since a united Western Europe would aspire to self-sufficiency and hence competition with the United States.²²

In any case, the foregoing comments in regard to the rhetorical issues of European-American relations should readily reveal the fallacy of the simplistic notion of American policy-makers in the early sixties vis-à-vis the special place of Great Britain in U. S. European policy. By no means would

British entry into Europe have ipso facto guaranteed the fruition of American desires for "Atlantic Partnership."

In general, the failure to achieve the goal of a strong integrated Europe has been due to indigenous European resistance. On the other hand, the failure to effect a "Partnership of Equals" has been related to American policy as well. The crux of the problem seems to be that the European aspiration for a larger role--for greater equality with the United States--has outrun their present capacity to fulfill it. Despite its potential, Europe cannot yet act as a "great power." No European entity now exists in most fields, including defense and foreign policy. Thus the new self-confidence and sense of growing power in Europe cannot find an effective outlet; they therefore are expressed in resistance to U. S. leadership. This, then, is the problem faced by American policy-makers at this stage: the Europe which would be a full partner is only emergent, yet the Europeans want and expect to be treated as equal partners already. Robert R. Bowie, writing on this problem, presented the dilemma as follows:

The United States will have to do more to show its readiness to work with Europe as a partner. Admittedly this is not easy to do while an effective European entity does not exist for foreign affairs, defense, and other fields. But the creation of the partnership cannot await a completed European Community. Like the Community, the partnership will have to develop by stages and evolve in step with it. As part of the process the United States will have to adjust its thinking to the import of a real partnership. As a nation, our attitudes still reflect much of the heritage of the postwar dependence of Europe. We have not absorbed what it must mean to share responsibility in monetary and economic policy, in defense, in agricultural programs, and

many other fields. In short, interdependence, while talked about, is not yet grasped as a practical restraint on our own freedom of action. In the period ahead, it would contribute to the prospects for both the European Community and Atlantic partnership if the United States could convey by its actions a greater awareness of what sharing responsibility with Europe will imply for both sides. . . .²³

(2) The East-West Issue

Writing in the spring of 1970, McGeorge Bundy predicted that historians would designate 1969-1970 and the beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks as a turning point in the relations between America and Europe.²⁴ Why? Because there is a notable uneasiness in Europe over the SALT talks, reflecting the realization that these talks imply changing strategic relationships. As President Nixon put it in the spring of 1969: "The West does not have the massive nuclear predominance today that it once had, and any sort of broad-based arms agreement with the Soviets would codify the present balance."²⁵ In short, Europeans fear that the "Superpowers" share a view of stability and security in Europe that is both hegemonic and static. While European fears of a new U. S.-Soviet hegemonic deal through SALT have been assuaged by skillful U. S. briefing of its allies at every stage of the negotiations, the residual fear of a new Yalta still lingers as an alternative to the specter of precipitous U. S. disengagement.

Initially each superpower viewed the stabilization of Europe in terms of the defeat or collapse of the opposing edifice. Since then, however, both sides have become strong enough to protect against losses, thereby denying to the other any possibility of a gain. The result has been a stalemate, a freezing of Europe into blocs. This stalemate has brought an era of peace and relative stability to Europe, but it has not solved Europe's problems. Current notions of

a negotiated settlement, offered as a test of détente in a more cooperative atmosphere, are based on the preservation of the balance of power and the stability which has resulted from the stalemated confrontation of two military alliances. Thus, even though the superpowers have appeared willing to discuss improvements in the political climate of Europe, their governing concept has remained that of the status quo. Europeans have thus concluded that both superpowers are not only satisfied with the status quo which they cannot alter unilaterally, but actually prefer its stability to the uncertainties that might be created by changing it. In the static view of the superpowers, the existence or nonexistence of détente is thus a measure of their success in making the status quo more stable and acceptable.

On the other hand, while Europeans have perceived the superpowers to be biased in favor of immobility in Europe, their own aim has become to change the status quo. They have not seen the stability established by the two blocs as an end in itself, but rather as a necessary and ~~we~~/come condition for regaining their own independence of action and addressing some of Europe's outstanding political problems. In contrast to the superpower concept, Europeans view détente as a flexible diplomacy, providing the opportunity to change the political face of Europe. For détente-oriented Europeans, then, the immediate goal is to address the outstanding issues and disputes piecemeal, in an effort to change the political climate of Europe. Such measures might include the improvement of

international understanding and communication, the establishment of new relationships and diplomatic practices, and the solution or elimination of continuous problems between states. Since many of the conflict-prone problems relate to Germany, the piecemeal solution of these has become a major goal of the Federal Republic, as witnesses Brandt's Ostpolitik.

Moreover, to Europeans, détente has the additional implication that "defense" is no longer considered the sum and total of "security." It has brought with it a willingness to explore and experiment. It is in this atmosphere that ideas of an all-European security system have gained currency. The form and structure of an all-European Security System is only dimly perceived, but the key seems to be interdependence among all the states of Europe. The object is to emphasize common interests and to build from them a web of human, commercial, technological, and political ties which will be stronger than the issues which continue to divide Europeans.²⁶

The Soviet Union and its East European allies have taken and maintained the initiative on this issue. Having received endorsement of Warsaw Pact meetings as far back as the Bucharest meeting of July 1966 and the somewhat more reluctant endorsement of NATO at its Twentieth Anniversary meeting in April 1969 in Washington, the proposal for^a European Security Conference has been placed on the European agenda and preparatory dialogue between individual European members of the two pacts has begun. However, the immediate impact of these moves on the overall security of Europe is likely to be quite

limited. Indeed, in a speech on the European Security Conference in February, 1971, German journalist Theo Sommer graphically compared the "conference" to the love-life of an elephant: it is carried on at a very high level, and one must wait many years for results.²⁷

Nevertheless, these initiatives cannot be disregarded, for they hold a key position in European-American relations. The American dilemma vis-à-vis this issue follows from the dual role of the Soviet Union as a superpower and as a European state. While the Soviet Union advocates détente in Europe, it maintains its heremonic hold over Eastern Europe. Thus it is vitally important for Americans to assess the process of détente and attempt to reconcile the American concept with the European concept in order that a united West may take a stand on the East-West issue. The proper, indeed the essential, course for Washington, accordingly, seems to be to take an active part in shaping the Western initiative on the East-West front. Along this line, it seems appropriate to conclude with these words of Laszlo Hadik:

The process of détente in Europe is parallel to our own search for a stable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. Risks abound in any such process, especially one which has burst out from under the pressure built up by twenty years of East-West hostility and intra-bloc conformity. The Europeans are not unaware of these risks, although they may look at them quite differently. For Americans, the greatest risk is to misinterpret these events and their meaning, and thus be out of tune with our allies as well as our own long-range interests. Conceivably we could bring the process to a halt, but only at the risk of prohibitive

damage to our relationships with our own allies, the bloc countries, and the Soviet Union. A return to the Cold War in order to have a dormant Europe would be absurd.²⁸

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

What kind of NATO for the 1970's?

In the cursory review of current issues of NATO debate which introduced this study, it was established that there continues to be a need for a security system in Western Europe and that, moreover, for the moment, NATO is the only effective means of meeting that security requirement. However, acceptance of these premises by no means dictates a static view of the future North Atlantic Alliance. In a keynote address entitled "New Directions in the Atlantic Community," Dr. Robert E. Osgood foresaw three alternatives for NATO in the 1970's, which he classified as: (1) the Atlantic structure, (2) a European settlement, and (3) an enhanced Europe.¹

In reference to Dr. Osgood's labels, the "Atlantic Structure" implies the maintenance of the status quo in NATO affairs, i.e., the maintenance of American preponderance, including the continuation by the United States to fill her seven traditional roles within the alliance. This is a vision of the future conceived as an indefinite projection of the present--a suggestion backed by little imagination and even less realism.

A dictum well known to national policy-makers is that if a country is not sensitive to its environment and consequently neglects to actively form its policy in accordance

with events, events themselves will impose a policy on the country. This seems to be the situation presently confronting NATO policy-makers. As discussed in the Introduction, extended American involvement in the Vietnam war has given impetus to an international debate about the nature of America's role and responsibility in international life. "It is a fact," André Fontaine, foreign editor of Le Monde wrote in 1969, "that there is not one government in Europe allied to the United States that would have dreamed for a second of sending a single soldier to Vietnam to fight on the American side. Strange alliance."²

Strange alliance indeed. Despite the fact that officials may cast aside concern for this incongruity of interests by explaining that the NATO Alliance embraces only the treaty area, this undercurrent of disagreement reflects meaningful trends in NATO relations. As has been shown in previous chapters, the European allies are growing restive under American leadership. At the same time, the United States is becoming less and less willing and able to continue its hegemonic role. Weariness and frustration with the burdens of global responsibility are visibly growing among the American people, and the ordeal in Vietnam may yet test their resolve to the breaking point. Certainly America will not emerge from the conflict unchanged.

Thus change is afoot, indeed is inevitable. The reluctance of all the members of the alliance to acknowledge this fact injures the alliance as a whole, for as the dictum

warns, if the will to deal with change is lacking, change will simply overtake the alliance and impose adjustments.

If change is inevitable, and if constructive steps must be taken collectively to insure a healthy alliance for the 1970's, what is the alternative? Dr. Osrood claims one alternative to be a European settlement negotiated through the NATO framework. This is a many-faceted proposition, the extensive implications of which it is not within the scope of this study to discuss. Let it suffice to say that while a European settlement might be the ultimate goal of NATO, immediate transformation to an overall European framework in this decade is no more feasible or realistic than are attempts to preserve the status quo in NATO. First, there is a rather fundamental anomaly in proposing to use the machinery of the western bloc in order to negotiate its own demise. At least, it is unrealistic given the present preponderant American role in NATO and given America's natural inclination towards duopoly. Furthermore, it seems that there is an important condition which must be met before meaningful negotiations for a European settlement can be conducted: West Europe should be a strong and cohesive entity. In sum, it is premature to look for a NATO in the seventies that is on the verge of being subsumed by a "European Settlement."

If the hope for a European settlement is premature, and the status quo formula over-ripe, what should be the goal for NATO in the 1970's? Dr. Osrood's "enhanced-Europe" alternative seems to provide a desirable and feasible solution to most issues of the NATO debate. It is true that the emergence of a

stronger and more cohesive European coalition within the alliance cannot take place overnight. Moreover, it should not be based only on appeasing a group of American senators who might prescribe the shock treatment to instigate an enhanced European role in NATO. To the contrary, American troops should be maintained in Europe while Europe restructures itself.

Therefore, the goal of NATO in the next decade should not and cannot be to rid Europe of the presence of her American ally. Rather, the appropriate policy is for each "partner" to re-evaluate its NATO role and then take coordinated steps toward realizing the design for an enhanced European role in the NATO of the 1970's. With the objective clarified, there is then the question of what practical steps can be taken now to move toward it.

What Role for America within the Alliance?

(1) Implications for American Strategic Leadership

Of the seven traditional American roles, the three which relate to its strategic preponderance (acting as pilot in strategic planning, filling the principal military commands and managing the nuclear deterrent for the alliance) presently symbolize more than anything else the hegemonic position of the United States in NATO. In fact, the nuclear issue has become a sort of touchstone in the relations between the United States and the European members of NATO. Increasingly Europeans feel that sharing in nuclear control is the mark of first-class status. The sobering experience of the MLF dramatically brought this to light.

In re-evaluating the strategic roles that the United States has played in NATO since 1949, with a view toward approaching an enhanced European bloc in the decade of the seventies, it is necessary to begin with one basic question: does Western Europe have the military resources to defend itself without the pervasive American preponderance now characteristic of NATO? Any assessment involves looking at the dimensions of both conventional and nuclear defense.

On a conventional level, official American estimates in recent years have argued that NATO has adequate forces for anything short of a massive attack on the scale of World War II.³ Furthermore, the great bulk of forces in Western Europe are European. Indeed, an American official recently claimed that very few people today have faith that the number of American

troops in Europe makes much difference militarily, although it does make a substantial difference politically and an even greater difference psychologically.* In substance, then, the Western Europeans have impressive conventional armies and air forces and are not short of means for increasing the forces if they believe it necessary to do so. The problem lies in organizing a European command structure that would promote their effective collaboration. In his book, The Atlantic Fantasy, David Calleo argues on this point that after long experience with NATO and the Common Market, the task should be well within the technical expertise of European bureaucrats.⁴ On the nuclear level, separate European nuclear forces already exist, and it is claimed that no technological or military reason prevents the Europeans, in some confederal combination, from acquiring a deterrent likely to convince the Soviets that the risk of invading Western Europe would be unacceptable, regardless of American reactions.⁶

Given these capabilities, it is necessary to examine just what an enhanced European role should entail. Here, as always, the nuclear issue is the more thorny problem. If Europe and the United States are to be more equal partners in defense,

*However as pointed out by David Calleo, "Any assessment or even comparison of conventional military strength in Europe is inevitably subject to question--partly because of unreliable and loaded statistics, but essentially because of the different forms of military organization, the relative state of training, equipment, and morale, or the capability of either side to mobilize and move troops to the front." The Atlantic Fantasy: The U. S., NATO, and Europe, Studies in International Affairs, No. 13 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 124-125.

Europeans will expect to share the ultimate right to utilize nuclear weapons for their defense. However, national nuclear weapons are bound to be wasteful of resources, ineffective as deterrents, and divisive of Europe and the alliance. Moreover, in justifying their national forces, both British and French leaders have insisted that they are necessary for the ultimate security of the nation and to avoid being a satellite of the United States. If that is constantly asserted, it would be rash to assume that political leaders of the Federal Republic, Italy, and perhaps even other members will not in the long run be driven to seek similar forces for their nations.⁶

It should be quite clear from previous chapters that the answer to the problem of an enhanced European role in the control of nuclear weapons was not to be found in a NATO strategic force such as the MLF. The lesson of the MLF was that the central problem is not one of giving the Europeans a veto over American strategic nuclear power. To the contrary, it is a choice of either giving the European members a bargaining lever to convince the United States to come to their aid when their vital interests are threatened or building a primarily self-sustaining European defense system with nuclear weapons of its own. At the same time, even this is not a real choice, for merely giving the Europeans a bargaining lever would not fundamentally alter the traditional relationship of protector and protectorate. Still the United States would pilot the strategic planning and uniquely manage the nuclear deterrent. In short, only a European deterrent can resolve the dilemma of nuclear control in a maturing European-American relationship.

But is such a force a realistic option? First, it has already been established that Western Europe does have the resources to mount a credible independent deterrent. Secondly, no international treaty commitment prohibits the establishment of such a force. While the question of succession to nuclear status is not dealt with in the Nonproliferation Treaty, Secretary of State Rusk explained the American view on this matter before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 10, 1968, stating that the NPT "would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components."⁷ Furthermore, the United States could provide sufficient technical aid to make the European force appear credible without violating the NPT.

Thus the larger problems involved in effecting a European deterrent would be organizational and political. It is not necessary here to present a precise blueprint for the organization of confederal nuclear arrangements. It does seem logical that it might consist of British and French forces coordinated by a planning group within which the Germans and Italians and perhaps a Benelux representative might participate. Whatever the specifics of the organization, it seems that related problems could be resolved if the political problems could be overcome. Thus it is on the political feasibility of this strategic option that its success or failure would hinge.

The central issue is Germany. The one item of common interest between east and west in the past has been that no one wants the Germans to have nuclear weapons of their own.

Therefore the inclusion of Germany in a scheme for a European deterrent would have significant political repercussions, perhaps the most significant of which would be its negative impact on Willy Brandt's efforts at Ostpolitik. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Germans would more than likely alarm the East sufficiently to foreclose, for the near future, the possibility of progress toward even a loose form of German reunification. Given this situation, it is obvious that the Germans especially would not be anxious to participate in such a scheme so long as they believe they are adequately protected by the present NATO deterrent.

This issue is indeed a gigantic stumbling block. However, the line of argument does not completely collapse at this point. It is appropriate here to re-establish the proposed overall goal for NATO in the seventies in order to weigh the importance to be attributed to the European deterrent scheme. It has been said that a modified role for America in Europe will not only be desirable in the present decade but will actually be inevitable. It has been further suggested that the altered American role should be accompanied by an enhanced European role. If Europe is to have a greater hand in sustaining its defense system, it appears that conventional defense, however well-organized, would be inadequate without a reliable nuclear backstop. Since the essence of American preponderance in the past has been its sole control over its nuclear guarantee, it necessarily follows that if a European defense system is to be in anyway self-sustaining, it must have nuclear weapons of its own. Therefore, if one accepts

this reasoning, the European deterrent becomes a fairly high priority issue.

In the end, the problem of the European nuclear force becomes a problem of priorities, for to advocate such a deterrent in the short run is to decrease chances of achieving an all-European settlement in the near future. However, a more penetrating analysis reveals that an all-European settlement is not really within reach in any case, for if an east-west settlement is not to mean a Finlandized Western Europe, an "enhanced Western Europe" is a prerequisite for a satisfactory European framework. A strengthened and more cohesive West Europe would provide the best prospects in the long run for two important conditions for European settlement: (1) a European framework for Germany and (2) a position of strength from which to bargain. Therefore, while positive steps toward strengthening Western Europe, including the building of a European deterrent, may in the short run frustrate Brandt's Ostpolitik, in the long run, it should give real substance to efforts at European détente.

But the question remains: is the political problem of Germany an insurmountable stumbling bloc? David Calleo of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, who has studied this problem in depth says no:

With the abdication of American hegemony, Britain and France, to prevent Germany from following them in nuclear weapons, would be under strong pressure to propose confederal arrangements and American connections which would satisfy Germany's reasonable fears for security.

Within a Western European coalition, the bargaining position of the Germans, even without their own nuclear force, would not be intolerably inferior. The Germans would presumably be contributing the largest land forces to the coalition. Since their financial contributions to the nuclear arrangements would be highly welcome, they could expect to bargain successfully for satisfactory participation and assurances. For it would be clear to all that without reasonable satisfaction from the allies, the Germans would inevitably be impelled toward either a separate nuclear force or a close accommodation with the Russians. For the various obvious reasons, British, French, and Germans alike, indeed the Russians themselves, should feel constrained to make the western coalition work.⁵

Moreover, it is not only among the American intellectual elite that this positive attitude toward the practicability of obtaining a European deterrent is popular. Last year an article was prepared for the Conservative Party in Great Britain, which advocated Anglo-French collaboration in the field of nuclear defense. In regard to a European deterrent, these Conservative British said:

If the U. S. nuclear umbrella gradually becomes less credibly during the 1970's, the only sure way of avoiding German overtures to Russia outside the NATO context, or a national German military build-up, is to ensure that some credible means of countering nuclear threats of blackmail from the East remains in European hands.

Any such European deterrent would have to be based on the existing British and French nuclear forces. A combination and modernization of the two might well be undertaken with a view to providing Europe with some continuing means of deterrence in the event of a U. S. run-down; it might also provide the foundation for a European deterrent of the future.⁶

Assuming, then, that the political problems could in fact be resolved, what are the implications for the American strategic role in NATO? The immediate impact is obvious. The United States would no longer be the sole pilot in strategic planning, nor would she single-handedly manage the nuclear

deterrent for the alliance. The third strategic role of filling the principal military commands in NATO brings out the question of the time scale on which these proposals should be carried out. Just how long it would take to instigate and implement a credible European nuclear force is impossible to predict. However, it does seem feasible that substantial progress toward that end could be made during this decade.

In the meantime, until significant steps have been taken toward this goal, the American commitment to Europe, conventional and nuclear, must remain firm. While maintaining the present level of its forces, the United States should offer technical aid and assistance towards making the European deterrent credible. Once the European deterrent has become a credible force, the political and psychological need for American divisions in Europe would be greatly reduced. At this stage, one could think in terms of replacing American soldiers and generals in Europe with a European nuclear force. In this way, modification of the role of filling the principal military commands could likewise be gradually achieved.

To conclude, what should the overall strategic role for America be in the middle and late seventies? In essence, it should be one of planned, coordinated devolution, toward the goal of creating a true European "partner." By no means should the ultimate aim be the complete removal of the American presence from the Continent. Just as American forces now serve primarily a political and psychological purpose, in the next era, token American forces in Europe would serve to remind Europeans and Americans alike of the lesson of two world wars:

the United States stake in Western Europe's security is very high, for even if the U. S. role as nuclear guarantor is relinquished, its many other ties--economic, political, cultural--will remain. Thus, in many ways, an attack on Europe will continue to be an attack on the United States.

(2) Prospects for American Political Leadership

Two or three patterns in the United States treatment of its NATO allies recur whenever the responsible American officials and whichever the party in power. There are many splendid sermons on how the United States should behave as a genuine partner. Sometimes in the same speech, but more often when caught off guard, the same or officials of equivalent standing reveal an attitude which appears to equate "NATO" with "they" or "American," depending upon the context.

The most obvious implication for the revised American political role within the NATO of the seventies is brought out in the above passage. There is a need for a change in American style; it is imperative that American rhetoric be translated into realization of what their statements mean. This challenge to American policy in and toward NATO will probably focus on two main problems in the 1970's: (1) the question of American relations with the developing unity being created by the EEC and (2) the growing desire by Europeans to bridge the gulf between East and West Europe.

Little has been said in the body of this paper specifically about American relations with the economic grouping of the Six, for American-Common Market affairs are themselves a very large area of study. However, it would be impossible to conclude this study of NATO without noting the major repercussions that an EEC making progress toward unity will have upon NATO political relations. In the first place, it has been affirmed in the preceding section that the mounting of an independent European deterrent should be an overall NATO goal to be worked towards in this decade. Implicit in the desire to create a European force is a need to effect an ever

increasing degree of European unity, which in turn implies the necessity to promote unity through the best organized grouping in Europe--the EEC. Therefore, in keeping with this line of thought, it is in the American interest to pursue that policy declared by President Kennedy in 1962 when he said:

We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but a partner. . . capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, . . . and developing coordinated policies in all economic and diplomatic areas.¹¹

However, while this is still the official Washington policy, numerous actions and words indicate that perhaps the Government does not really believe in its policy. Indeed, some commentators claim that there has been a decisive hardening of heart towards the Community on the part of the Nixon Administration. They cite Nixon's warm embrace of de Gaulle in Washington in the spring of 1970 and, by implication, his policies; his failure to receive the President of the European Communities Commission, Jean Rey, during his visit to Washington last spring; the careful vagueness of Presidential expressions of support for "the concept" of European unity. What appears to be the unofficial policy was, in fact, stated publicly by one White House official after leaving office early in 1970:

There is no longer any reason to pay a commercial price for non-existent political unity in Europe. We should be far less tolerant of the abuses of the Common Market agricultural policy but tailor our retribution so that it does not hurt other countries.¹²

It is true that there are solid reasons for the souring of American regard for the Community. It would be to the

advantage of both Europeans and Americans for the Europeans to be attentive to the causes for economic apprehension on the part of the United States: swelling U. S. balance-of-payments deficits, dwindling trade surpluses, and falling farm exports. However, any policy must be based on a set of priorities. In weighing the possible damage that could be done to the United States by protectionist Common Market policies, one official testified to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress that:

In the absence of American retaliation, the mere economic consequences of a much enlarged FEC would not be too harmful, certainly not to the United States. . . . If our exports grow a little more slowly for a few years, it will not be a matter of life and death, not even for particular American industries. The risk lies rather in angry American overreaction.¹³

Thus it appears that the underlying interest of the United States in strengthening and broadening the European Community and U. S. ties with it must take precedence over the demands of the Department of Agriculture. This means that the United States must do more than support "the concept" of European unity. It must translate the implications of the concept into meaningful actions that will convince Europe that Washington truly is committed to building a "partner" in Europe.

The other major challenge that is likely to confront American political leadership in the seventies is the East-West issue. Europeans contend that very few Americans understand the extent to which the division between East and West Europe is considered an unnatural situation, which leads

Americans to place less emphasis on the issue of détente than do Europeans. To further complicate the situation, since détente means different things to different people, there is no easy consensus on how to go about "managing" it. In late 1966 the NATO Council launched the "Harmel Exercise," a year-long study aimed at promoting NATO as the instrument for coordinating western diplomatic policy.

While reaffirming that NATO is a defensive alliance determined to insure the security of its members, the Harmel Report stated that the treaty organization is also a political coalition capable of opening a dialogue with the Warsaw Pact nations in order to create a cooperative and friendly basis for a lasting peace. The report stressed that these two tasks were complementary rather than contradictory and went on to make the important point that, while member countries should each play a part in promoting an improvement of relations with Eastern Europe, their individual efforts at détente should not be allowed to split the alliance. Implicit in this conclusion is the need for more interallied consultation about matters of détente than has been practiced in the past.*

It seems that the Harmel Report represents a wise approach to the problem of détente management in the alliance. It is

* Perhaps a clarification is in order here. While it has been suggested that East-West negotiations might slow down in reaction to the proposed European deterrent, it has NOT been suggested that these efforts should be discontinued. To the contrary, probes to the east should continue with the hope of making really substantial progress once Europe can truly bargain from a position of strength.

significant to note that the Harmel recommendations have double-edged implications for the United States, for at times the United States will be taking the initiative; at times another member, e.g., the FRG, will be consulting its NATO allies on its initiatives. But in all cases, the assertion of an earlier chapter holds true: it is vitally important for Americans to assess the process of détente in an attempt to reconcile the American concept with the European concept in order that a united West may take a stand on the East-West issue.

Indeed, truly effective alliance diplomacy vis-à-vis the East-West issue might adopt the rule of the British Cabinet of "speaking with one voice." Bilateral diplomacy is much more flexible and far easier to arrange than multilateral diplomacy, which is of necessity slow-moving and complex. It is unfortunate, therefore, when individual initiatives are made less effective by being exposed to outspoken criticism of public officials in member countries. For example, while it is difficult to accurately judge its impact, it seems inevitable that official American criticism of Ostpolitik cannot have enhanced Brandt's efforts. It seems that it would be much better to air these differences in NATO consultations.

On the other hand, consultations on American initiatives have been successful and should be continued. For example, during negotiations leading to the nonproliferation treaty of 1967, several European governments, especially the West German and Italian, became alarmed lest, in its eagerness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, the United States was neglecting the

legitimate interests of its allies. Consultation under NATO auspices helped to allay the anxieties. A similar move was made by President Nixon in February 1969 when he announced that he would consult with the European allies before beginning negotiations with the USSR about mutual limitations on nuclear armaments.¹⁴

In summary, it is likely that the question of American relations with the EEC and the East-West issue will be the most challenging political aspects of the United States relations with its NATO allies in the seventies. To deal effectively with this "American challenge," a particularly consistent and sensitive diplomacy will be required of the United States. Indeed, the most important element of American diplomacy in an era of "enhancing Europe" will be to understand the meaning of working efficiently on a partnership basis in the period of transition, which demands that America practice giving profound respect to views and interests other than her own.

Having looked ahead to the prospects for the American political role in the coming years, it remains only to assess how this role compares to the traditional political roles: guiding the general policies of NATO; inducing, energizing, and stimulating actions which the European allies can only undertake on their own; and demonstrating by example what the others might profitably do. In the first place, it should be apparent that the United States traditional political roles are not as out of tune with its future role as are the

strategic roles. For example, general policy guidance during the period of enhancing the European "caucus" should continue, for it is only realistic to recognize that the United States will continue to be the strongest element in the North Atlantic Community during the transition period. Still, the role of genuine guidance need not imply hegemonic dictates but rather can be handled with modesty and understanding.

The second role of stimulating actions which the European allies can only undertake on their own likewise must continue, indeed, will be of prime importance. This role in particular requires skilled diplomacy, for despite their present restiveness, it will not be an easy job to demonstrate to the Europeans that their future lies in a strengthened European coalition that will be primarily responsible for its own defense.

Finally, the third role of providing an example for the European allies must also continue. Giving technical aid and assistance to the future European deterrent would be in line with this role. Also, using the NATO framework to consult allies on initiatives that may affect them provides a good example of what other allies might also profitably do. In essence, then, what is needed in the political realm is not a change in kind but rather a change in style.

There is still one role from the Fox typology that has not been discussed in these concluding pages: making good the deficiencies of the alliance as a whole. While being neither specifically a strategic role nor a political role, it seems that perhaps this undertaking in the past has been

the crux of the overall American posture in NATO. It is this role, then, that characterizes the "unequal" partnership as much as any single strategic or political role. But while this task has in the past been a conscious effort, it should in the future unconsciously wither away as Europe becomes a more cohesive entity capable of taking care of itself. Once it is no longer necessary for America to make good the deficiencies of the alliance as a whole, it is probable that the goal of an "enhanced Europe" will have been reached.

In conclusion, what is the American role in Europe to be in the coming years? It has been noted that there is a tendency among some Americans to view the American role in Europe as largely completed. Preoccupied with domestic affairs and with the Vietnam conflict, American policy toward Europe has increasingly acquired a passive character. However, all the findings of this present study militate against such an uninspired stance. To the contrary, today more than ever, an active American policy is needed if events are not to impose their will on the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. What is demanded of America today is a long-term program to construct an enhanced European Community in the North Atlantic Alliance. What is demanded, in short, is a deliberate and creative response to the necessity for shaping a future order.

FOOTNOTES

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- ³James Avery Joyce, End of an Illusion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 52-53.
- ⁴Mike Mansfield, "American Forces in Europe: The Pros and the Cons," Atlantic Community Quarterly, VIII (Spring 1970), 16.
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- ⁶Alastair Buchan, "The Purpose of NATO and its Future Development," Atlantic Community Quarterly VIII (Spring 1970), 49-50.
- ⁷Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO After Twenty Years--in American Perspective," NATO Letter, VIII (June 1970), 19.
- ⁸Elliot L. Richardson, "American Forces in Europe: The Pros and the Cons," Atlantic Community Quarterly, VIII (Spring 1970), 11.
- ⁹Earlan Cleveland, "Alliance with a Future," Atlantic Community Quarterly, VIII (Summer 1970), 157-158.
- ¹⁰Buchan, Atlantic Community Quarterly, p. 52.
- ¹¹Fred Luchsinger, "No Substitute for Security," Atlantic Community Quarterly, VIII (Summer 1970), 157-158.
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- ¹⁵The analysis of the last section borrowed from the ideas of Klaus Knorr, "Is NATO Indispensable?" in NATO: Past, Present, Prospect, The Headline Series, No. 168 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, December 1969), pp. 23-40.

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¹⁰William T. R. Fox and Annette P. Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 65.

¹¹Elliot L. Richardson, "American Forces in Europe: The Pros and the Cons," Atlantic Community Quarterly VIII (Spring 1970), 7-8.

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²Carl H. Amme, Jr., NATO Without France: A Strategic Appraisal (Stanford: Stanford University, 1962), pp. 11-24.

³John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," address to the Council on Foreign Relations on Jan. 12, 1954, DSR, Vol. XXX, No. 761 (Jan. 25, 1954), pp. 107-110.

⁴Klaus Knorr, NATO: Past, Present, Prospect, Headline Series, No. 198 (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, December 1969), pp. 13-14.

⁵"Europe: Of Defense and Detente," Time, XCII (December 14, 1970), 24.

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¹²U. S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Atomic Energy Legislation through the 86th Congress, 86th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 28-29, cited by Thomson, Ibid., p. 101.

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¹³Nicholas Pratt, "Ostpolitik from the Western European Vantage Point," paper presented to a seminar group at the Conference on the Atlantic Community, Georgetown University, February 7, 1971, pp. 4-6.

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